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AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-
EXPANSION OF DISCOVERY
On April 22, 1974, the Supreme Court of the
United States promulgated by order its version
of the Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.' These rules would have
taken effect as law on August 1, 1974, but
Congress interposed a law postponing the
effective date of the amendments to August 1,
1975.2 If precedent were a reliable predictive
tool, Congress would probably pass these rules
on the extended deadline without serious
modifications.3 But because of the recent scru-
"Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure for the United States District
Courts, 62 F.R.D. 271 (1974) (hereinafter cited as
Amendments).
2 88 Stat. 397 (July 30, 1974). Congress did not
take this type of action when the 1966 amendments
were submitted to them. The dissents of Justices
Black and Douglas when the 1966 amendments
were transmitted reveals some justification for
such closer scrutiny. Proposed Amendments to
Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States
District Courts, 39 F.R.D. 69, 272, 276 (1966)
(Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting). The Justices
complained, inter alia, that the Supreme Court was
acting merely as a conduit for the rules which were
recommended by the Advisory Committee to the
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure. Furthermore, the transmission of these
proposed rules through the Supreme Court to
Congress, without any requirement of enactment
by Congress, might be unconstitutional. Accord,
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for
the United States District Courts, 374 U.S. 865,
865-66 (1963) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
s The original Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure for the United States District Courts were
transmitted to Congress by the Attorney General
on January 3, 1945, and became effective on
March 21, 1946. Advisory Committee notes were
recommended shortly after the original transmittal.
4 F.R.D. 405 (1945). These rules have been
amended as follows: December 27, 1948, effective
January 1, 1949, 8 F.R.D. 610 (1948); December
27, 1948, effective October 20, 1949, 8 F.R.D. 610(1948); April 12, 1954, effective July 1, 1954;
April 9, 1956 effective ninety days thereafter, 18
F.R.D. 514 (1956); February 28, 1966, effective
July 1, 1966, 39 F.R.D. 69 (1966); December 4,
tiny which has been given to discovery proce-
dures by courts and commentators,4 some
changes will most likely be made before the
amendments meet with full Congressional ap-
proval.
The amended rules follow trends set by the
courts, the Advisory Committee to the Stand-
ing Committee on Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure,5 and the American Bar Association
Advisory Committee on Pre-Trial Proceed-
ings" in liberalizing the discovery procedures
available to both the defense and the prosecu-
tion. The amendments specifically related to
discovery are the changes to rule 12 on Plead-
1967, effective July 1, 1968, 43 F.R.D. 61, 164(1967); March 1, 1971, effective July 1, 1971;
April 24, 1972, effective October 1, 1972, 56
F.R.D. 143 (1972). A review of these amendments
shows the short period from order by Supreme
Court to the effective date, thus demonstrating the
traditional "rubber stamp" attitude which Congress
has taken toward its input to these rules.
4See, e.g., Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470(1973); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
(1972) ; Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) ;
Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264 (1959); Amendments, supra note 1,
at 308, 315 (Advisory Committee Notes) ; FED. R.
CUM. P. 16 (Advisory Committee Notes); AMER-
ICAN BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS RFELATING TO Discov-
ERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRAL 35-40 (Ap-
proved Draft, 1970) (hereinafter cited as ABA);
Nakell, The Effect of Due Process on Criminal
Defense Discovery, 62 Ky. L.J. 58 (1973) (here-
inafter cited as Nakell, Dite Process); Nakell,
Criminal Discovery for the Defense and the Pros-
ecution-The Developing Constitutional Considera-
tions, 50 N.C.L. Rzv. 437 (1972) (hereinafter cited
as Nakell, Discovery); Note, Prosecutorial Dis-
covery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HARv. L. REv.
994 (1972) (hereinafter cited as Rule 16 Discovery) ;
Comment, Constitutional Infirmities of the Revised
Illinois Rules of Criminal Discovery, 7 JoHN MAR.
J. PRAC. & PROC. 364 (1974).
5 Hereinafter referred to as the Advisory Com-
mittee.
e ABA, supra note 4.
COMMENTS
ing and Motions Before Trial, and rule 16 on
Discovery and Inspection, along with the addi-
tion of two new rules, 12.1 and 12.2, which deal
with Notice of Alibi and Insanity Defenses.7
The Supreme Court's transmittal of the rules
to Congress does not mean that it has passed
judgment on their constitutionality.8 This com-
ment will review how these amended rules
change the scope of discovery, and discuss the
constitutional and procedural problems which
may arise in their implementation.
I. RULE 12-MOTIONS BEFORE TRIAL
The changes in this rule which deal with
discovery are that requests for discovery must
be made prior to trial9 and that the govern-
rnent may give notice of its intention to use
certain evidence, either at the request of the
defendant or at the discretion of the gov-
ernment10 Prior to this amendment, the de-
Rule 15 also deals with discovery to a limited
extent by providing for depositions of witnesses
who may be unavailable for testimony. Rule 16
makes the written record of these depositions dis-
coverable. However, because its impact is of a sec-
ondary nature, rule 15 is not the subject of this
comment.
s Accord, Proposed Amendments to Rules of
Criminal Procedure for the United States District
Courts, 39 F.R.D. 69, 272 (1966) (Black, J., dis-
senting). Such a ruling would be outside the con-
stitutional power given to the Court in Article III,
because it would be an advisory opinion, and not a
"case or controversy." U.S. CONST. art. III.
9 Rule 12. Pleadings and motions before trial;
defenses and objections.
(b) Pretrial motions. Any defense, objection,
or request which is capable of determination
without the trial of the general issue may be
raised before trial by motion. Motions may be
vritten or oral at the discretion of the judge.
The following must be raised prior to trial:
(4) Requests for discovery under rule 16....
Amendments, supra note 1, at 287. The current
rule on time of motions for discovery is as fol-
lows:
Rule 16. Discovery and Inspection.
(f) Time of Motions. A motion under this
rule may be made only within 10 days after
arraignment or at such reasonable later time
as the court may permit. The motion shall in-
clude all relief sought under this rule. A sub-
sequent motion may be made only upon a
showing of cause why such motion would be
in the interest of justice.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(f).
10 Rule 12. Pleadings and motions before trial;
defenses and objections.
fendant had less flexible time limitations upon
his motion for discovery. Rule 16 now pro-
vides that the defendant make his motion for
discovery within ten days of arraignment, sub-
ject to the court's discretion to allow a motion
after the ten-day period "upon a showing of
cause why such motion would be in the inter-
ests of justice." "I Since this portion of rule 16
has been eliminated in the amendments, and
the motion for discovery has been added to the
list of motions which must be made prior to
trial, the defendant has up until the time of
trial to enter the motion.1 2 Another benefit to
the defendant is the elimination of the require-
ment to show "cause" why he has not waived
(d) Notice by the government of the intention
to use evidence.
(1) At the discretion of the government. At
the arraignment or as soon thereafter as is
practicable, the government may give notice to
the defendant of its intention to use specified
evidence at trial in order to afford the defend-
ant an opportunity to raise objections to such
evidence prior to trial under subdivision
(b) (3) of this rule.
(2) At the request of the defendant. At the
arraignment or as soon thereafter as is prac-
ticable the defendant may, in order to afford
an opportunity to move to suppress evidence
under subdivision (b) (3) of this rule, request
notice of the government's intention to use (in
its evidence in chief at trial) any evidence
which the defendant may be entitled to dis-
cover under Rule 16 subject to any relevant
limitations prescribed in Rule 16.
Amendments, supra note 1, at 287-88. There is no
corresponding provision in the current rules.
"I FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(f).
12 The benefit of more time for the defendant
may be illusory because prudent counsel would or-
dinarily move for discovery as a matter of course
as soon as possible. Realization of any benefit as-
sumes that the amount of time between artaign-
ment and trial is usually greater than ten days.
Due to the current congestion in the courts, this
assumption seems valid. See AMERICAN BAR
Ass'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL 1(Approved Draft, 1968). For instance, the median
time interval from filing to disposition of criminal
cases completed during the fiscal year ended June
30, 1973, for all 90 United States district courts
was 3.9 months. 1973 DIR. OF ADM. OFFICE OF
U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 412. Since the pre-trial
procedures usually comprise a large portion of
that time period, the time between arraignment
and trial probably averages more than ten days.
See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS RELATING
TO SPEEDY TRIAL 15 (Approved Draft, 1968).
Also the time limits for disposition of criminal
cases set in response to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 50(b) indicate that the time period
from arraignment to trial is probably greater than
ten days in most cases. 1973 DIR. OF ADM. OFFICE
OF U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 771-74.
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relief by his failure to make a discovery re-
quest before trial.' 3
Section (d) of rule 12 helps to eliminate un-
necessary motions to suppress evidence by al-
lowing the defendant to obtain notice from the
government of its intention to use certain
evidence at trial.14 This section is redundant to
the extent that it covers evidence which the
defendant can discover under amended rule 16.
However, since amended rule 16 does not limit
discovery to evidence which the government
will use at trial,' 5 prudent defense counsel
would have to scrutinize all disclosed evidence
to determine the admissibility of each item,
and ultimately, which ones he will move to
suppress. The amended rule 12 does not ex-
pand the number of items the defense can dis-
cover; it instead increases the amount of infor-
mation which must be disclosed about those
items. This can speed up the pre-trial process
by eliminating the necessity for a motion to
suppress certain evidence because the defense
knows that the government does not intend to
use it at trial. It also aids the defendant in the
preparation of his case because he knows
which evidence he will have to rebut at trial.
Unfortunately, this benefit of amended rule 12
may be lost to the defendant because there is
no sanction requiring the government to com-
ply with the defendant's request.' 6 Without a
legislative or judicial mandate compelling dis-
closure, the discovery opportunity has little
value.17
13 Rule 16(f) calls for "... a showing of cause
why such motion would be in the interest of jus-
tice." FED. R. CRIm. P. 16(f). The amended rule's
elimination of the qualifier, "in the interest of jus-
tice," is only a benefit to the defense to the extent
that it is not contained in the one-word require-
ment of "cause." The trial court seems to have the
discretion to interpret this standard of "cause"
freely, and could conceivably interpolate the quali-
fier into the amended rule. See, e.g., Hellman v.
United States, 339 F.2d 36, 39 (5th Cir. 1964), in
which cause for discovery of certain work sheets
was construed by the trial court to mean material-
ity which would justify a probable delay.
24 Amendments, supra note 1, at 287-88. See id.
at 290-91 (Advisory Committee Notes).
'1Id. at 305. For example, the defendant can
discover his own relevant written or recorded
statements or testimony before a grand jury, even
though these items will not be used by the govern-
ment as evidence in chief at trial.
16Id. at 287-88.
'7 The Advisory Committee suggested that no
sanction was necessary because it believed that at-
Because of the inadequacy of this amended
rule, it should be changed to make government
notice to the defendant mandatory upon re-
quest, with sanctions for non-compliance. This
suggestion is in keeping with the current phi-
losophy espousing more liberal discovery rights
for the defendant, in the interest of fairness
torneys for the government would, upon request of
the defendant, voluntarily give notice of intention
to use evidence at trial, citing an instance of com-
pliance in the past. Id. at 290 (Advisory Commit-
tee Notes). The committee also implies that the
only workable sanction for noncompliance is an
automatic exclusion of evidence, and this might
put an undue burden on the exclusionary rule.
The Advisory Committee's logic is faulty in two
respects. First, prior voluntary compliance by the
government does not insure compliance in the fu-
ture. The American Bar Association Advisory
Committee on Pre-Trial Proceedings was con-
cerned about the possibility that the government
may fail to answer a request for information such
as the use of electronic surveillance or the exist-
ence of any relevant material provided by an in-
formant, so it made all of the prosecutor's obliga-
tions mandatory in its recommendation. This latter
committee provided for sanctions including an
order for discovery by the court, and ". . . such
other order as it deems just under the circum-
stances." ABA, supra note 4, at 14-15, 106-07.
In addition, all the types of discovery available
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may
be compelled by the requesting party via motion
for an order from the court. FED. R. Civ. P.
37(a). Failure to comply with such order may be
contempt of court. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b). Al-
though these civil rules do not require disclosure
of intention to use evidence, they do allow discov-
ery of certain characteristics of the evidence such
as the description, nature, custody, condition and
location of some tangible items. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b) (1). The sanctions provided for failure of a
party to comply with requests for this information
are the same as those provided for failure to pro-
duce the tangible evidence itself. FED. R. Civ. P.
37(a), 37(b). In other words, neither the Ameri-
can Bar Association Advisory Committee nor the
committee which wrote the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure believe that discovery can be fully
effective without a means to enforce the rules at
the discretion of the trial court.
Second, while in the comments to rule 12 the
Advisory Committee denounces the unfairness of
automatic exclusion of evidence about which the
government has inadvertently failed to give notice,
it recommends exclusion as an alternative sanction
in amended rule 16(d) (2). Amendments, supra
note 1, at 307. The committee does not explain
why there is no burden on the government or on
the exclusionary rule itself in the notes to this lat-
ter provision. It previously stated that in the inter-
ests of correcting the prejudice resulting from a
failure to comply with a valid request for discov-
ery, the court should have wide discretion in deal-
ing with such a failure. Jd. at 317 (Advisory




in the criminal justice system. The principal
argument of the government against making
the rule mandatory is that it deprives the gov-
ernment of the element of surprise which it
would have if allowed to refrain from desig-
nating which of the defendant's statements,
documents, other tangible objects, and grand
jury testimony it intends to use at trial. This
justification based upon the advantage of sur-
prise is one element of the "sporting event" or
"poker game" view of discovery, and has been
criticized by courts and commentators alike.' 8
II. RULES 12.1 AND 12.2-NoTICE OF ALIBI
AND NOTICE OF INSANITY DEFENSES
Rule 12.1 requires that the defendant notify
the prosecution prior to trial if he intends to
rely upon the defense of alibi. A transfer of
information is then ordered, in which the gov-
ernment must first disclose details of the date,
time, and place of the alleged offense,19 then
the defendant must disclose the place at which
28 It has been increasingly recognized that due
process fairness and the interest of truth ne-
cessitate adjustment from the one-time concep-
tion of a criminal trial as a sporting contest
between two sides, and requires, e.g., disclo-
sure by the prosecutor of material helpful to
the defense, and an expanding concept of dis-
covery as a two-way channel between prosecu-
tion and defense.
United States v. Reese, 463 F.2d 830, 833 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 82 (1970); Brennan, The Criminal Prosecu-
tion: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth, 1963
WASH. U.L.Q. 279, 290-95 (1963).
19 The date, time, and place of the alleged of-
fense are not explicitly required to be disclosed to
the defendant in the indictment or information ac-
cording to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
7(c). The government may disclose them volun-
tarily in the information of indictment; in any
event, the "essential elements" of the offense must
be charged. See, e.g., United States v. Barbato,
471 F.2d 918, 921 (5th Cir. 1973); United States
ex rel. Harris v. Illinois, 457 F.2d 191, 196-97
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 860 (1972) (the
defendant must also be informed of the offense
with sufficient clarity so that he will not be misled
in preparing his defense). The date, time, and
place of the offense may not be some of its essen-
tial elements, but only auxiliary information which
identifies the offense to the defendant.
The defendant has another means by which he
might be able to obtain this information under the
current rules. If he cannot adequately prepare his
defense from the facts given in the indictment or
information, he can move for a bill of particulars.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(f); United States v. Barbato,
supra, at 921. The date, time, and place of the al-
leged offense are among the items which the de-
he claims to have been, and the names and ad-
dresses of the witnesses upon whom he will
rely to establish his alibi. Lastly, the govern-
ment must disclose the names and addresses of
witnesses20 which it will use to establish the
defendant's presence at the scene of the alleged
offense.
21
fendant can obtain in the bill. See, e.g., United
States v. Thomas, 299 F. Supp. 494 (E.D. Mo.
1968)(time and place of manufacture of firearms
in violation of federal law); United States v.
Acarino, 270 F. Supp. 526 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
The grant of a bill of particulars is within the
discretion of the trial court, whose ruling will only
be disturbed upon an abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,
United States v. Clay, 476 F2d 1211, 1215 (9th
Cir. 1973). Thus there is no guarantee that the
defendant will obtain the information requested via
his motion for a bill of particulars. The Advisory
Committee does not comment on its rationale for
requiring disclosure, in the amended rules, of the
date, time, and place of the alleged offense. A pos-
sible basis for this provision is the committee's re-
luctance to leave the discovery of such information
to the discretion of the trial court when the de-
fendant cannot prepare a sufficient alibi defense
without it.
20 There is no federal discovery provision, ex-
cept in capital cases, which requires disclosure of
names and addresses of witnesses to the defendant.
18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1970).
The defendant may, nevertheless, move for a bill
of particulars under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 7(f), but he is generally not entitled to
receive a bill which contains the names and ad-
dresses of government witnesses. See, e.g., Year-
gain v. United States, 314 F.2d 881, 882 (9th Cir.
1963) ; United States v. Elliott, 266 F. Supp. 318,
327 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
a' The text of Rules 12.1 and 12.2 is as follows:
Rule 12.1. Notice of alibi.
(a) Notice by defendant. If a defendant in-
tends to rely upon the defense of alibi, he
shall, within the time provided for the filing
of pretrial motions or at such later time as
the court may direct, notify the attorney for
the government in writing of such intention
and file a copy of such notice with the clerk.
(b) Disclosure of information and witnesses.
Upon receipt of notice that the defendant in-
tends to rely upon an alibi defense, the attor-
ney for the government shall inform the de-
fendant in writing of the specific time, date,
and place at which the offense is alleged to
have been committed. The defendant shall then
inform the attorney for the government in
writing of the specific place at which he
claims to have been at the time of the alleged
offense and the names and addresses of the
witnesses upon whom he intends to rely to es-
tablish such alibi. The attorney for the gov-
ernment shall then inform the defendant in
writing of the names and addresses of the wit-
nesses upon whom the government intends to
rely to establish defendant's presence at the
scene of the alleged offense.
(c) Time of giving information. The court
[Vol. 66
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Rule 12.1 is very similar to the Florida
notice-of-alibi-defense rule which the Supreme
Court held constitutional in Williams v.
may fix the time within which the exchange
of information referred to in subdivision (b)
shall be accomplished.
(d) Continuing duty to disclose. If prior to
or during trial, a party learns of an additional
witness whose identity, if known, should have
been included in the information furnished
under subdivision (b) of this rule, the party
shall promptly notify the other party or his
attorney of the existence and identity of such
additional witness.
(e) Failure to comply. Upon the failure of
either party to comply with the requirements
of this rule, the court may exclude the testi-
mony of any undisclosed witness offered by
such party as to the. defendant's absence from,
or presence at, the scene of the alleged of-
fense. This rule shall not limit the right of
the defendant to testify in his own behalf.
(f) Exceptions. For good cause shown, the
court may grant an exception to any of the
requirements of this rule.
Rule 12.2. Notice of defense based upon mental
condition.
(a) Defense of insanity. If a defendant in-
tends to rely upon the defense of insanity at
the time of the alleged crime, he shall, within
the time provided for the filing of pretrial mo-
tions or at such later time as the court may
direct, notify the attorney for the government
in writing of such intention and file a copy of
such notice with the clerk. If there is a failure
to comply with the requirements of this subdi-
vision, insanity may not be raised as a de-
fense. The court may for cause shown allow
late filing of the notice or grant additional
time to the parties to prepare for trial or
make such other order as may be appropriate.
(b) Mental disease or defect inconsistent with
the mental element required for the offense
charged if a defendant intends to introduce
expert testimony relating to a mental disease,
defect, or other condition bearing upon the
issue of whether he had the mental state re-
quired for the offense charged, he shall, within
the time provided for the filing of pretrial mo-
tions or at such later time as the court may
direct, notify the attorney for the government
in writing of such intention and file a copy of
such notice with the clerk. The court may for
cause shown allow late filing of the notice or
grant additional time to the parties to prepare
for trial or make such other order as may be
appropriate.
(c) Psychiatric examination. In an appropri-
ate case the court may, upon motion of the at-
torney for the government, order the defend-
ant to submit to a psychiatric examination by
a psychiatrist designated for this purpose in
the order of the court.
(d) Failure to comply. If there is a failure
to give notice when required by subdivision
(b) of this rule or to submit to an examina-
Florida.22 The defendant, Williams, had com-
plied with the Florida statute requiring notice
of alibi defense and later claimed that such dis-
closure was violative of his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. The Court
held that there was no compulsion 23 of the de-
fendant to testify:
That the defendant faces such a dilemma de-
manding a choice between complete silence
and presenting a defense has never been
thought an invasion of the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination. . . . However
"testimonial" or "incriminating" the alibi de-
fense proves to be, it cannot be considered
"compelled' within the meaning of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. 24
tion when ordered under subdivision (c) of
this rule, the court may exclude the testimony
of any expert witness offered by the defendant
on the issue of his mental state.
Amendments, supra note 1, at 292-93, 295. These
rules have no counterpart in the current Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, nor are they part of
the original package of amendments which was
suggested by the Advisory Committee in 1970.
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
United States District Courts, 48 F.R.D. 553, 597
(1970). They were proposed at a later date. Pre-
liminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
United States District Courts, 52 F.R.D. 409,
432-36 (1971).
They are similar in many respects to rules
which have already been adopted in various states.
With regard to notice-of-alibi statutes see, e.g.,
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1200 (1967) ; KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-3218 (Supp. 1971); OU . STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 585 (1969). At least fifteen states have
adopted some type of alibi-notice requirement. For
a complete list see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 82 n.11 (1969). Only a few state courts have
had to consider the propriety of penalizing non-
compliance. See, e.g., State ex rel. Simos v.
Burke, 41 Wis. 2d 129, 137-38, 163 N.E.2d 177,
180 (1968). For a representative survey of the
state courts as of 1964 see Epstein, Advance No-
tice of Alibi, J. CRm. L.C. & P.S. 29, 37-38
(1964). For notice-of-insanity statutes see, e.g.,
ARiZONA R. Cum. P. 192(A) (1956); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-3219 (Supp. 1971); MicH.
Com7. LAws ANN. §§ 76820, 768.21 (1968) ; REv.
CODE MONT. § 95-503 (1947).22399 U.S. 78 (1970).
23 Accord, State v. Nunn, 113 N.J. Super. 161,
273 A2d 366 (1971). See Rider v. Crouse, 357
F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1966)(exclusion of defendant's
evidence of alibi in a state criminal case because
he failed to give notice as required by statute did
not deprive him of a constitutional right).
24399 U.S. at 84. In their opinion, Justices
Black and Douglas attempted to show that the de-
fendant was helping to prosecute himself by in-
forming the government of his defense. They con-
1975]
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The Williams case did not, however, resolve
all the constitutional questions raised by this
notice-of-alibi rule. A remaining problem posed
by the Court was whether the constitutionality
of alibi-notice rules might depend on whether
the defendant enjoys reciprocal discovery
against the government. This issue was later
discussed in Wardius v. Oregon,25 in which
Mr. Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court,
said that due process forbids enforcement of
non-reciprocal notice-of-alibi rules. His use of
the term "reciprocal" includes mandatory equal
discovery for both prosecution and defense,
26
and this is what the Court promulgated in rule
12.1.27
But upon careful scrutiny, it can be seen
that the provisions of the rule are not exactly
reciprocal under the Wardius formulation. In
Wardins the Court held that it was fundamen-
tally unfair for the defendant to be required to
disclose the details of his defense, if he is not
allowed to discover the evidence which the
government will use in rebuttal. Rule 12.1(b)
requires notification to the government of "the
names and addresses of the witnesses upon
whom [the defendant] intends to rely to estab-
lish such alibi." 28 Since proof of alibi demands
a showing that the defendant was absent from
the place of the crime at the time it was alleg-
edly committed, 29 there are two types of wit-
nesses who can establish the defendant's alibi.
One type says that he was at the place where
tend that any assistance given to the prosecution,
even in the form of mere disclosure, is self-incrim-
inating. Id. at 111. (Black & Douglas, JJ., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
25 412 U.S. 470, 472 (1973). Mr. Justice Mar-
shall did not explicitly define "reciprocal," nor did
any of the courts which cited Wardius. In spite of
the lack of a positive definition, the Court did hold
that the Oregon statute in question was not
reciprocal, because it did not even mention the
right of the defendant to obtain discovery of the
prosecution's alibi-rebuttal witnesses.
26 Since ". . . discovery must be a two-way
street .. ." and the Florida rule held constitutional
in Williams required state disclosure to the de-
fendant, permissive reciprocity is not sufficient. Id.
at 474. Two types of discovery would therefore
conform with the Wardius formulation: that
which is mandatory for both prosecution and de-
fense, and that which conditions prosecution dis-
covery upon the prior disclosure to the defendant.
27 Amendments, supra note 1, at 292.
28 Id.
29 Roper v. United States, 403 F.2d 796, 798
(5th Cir. 1968).
the defendant claims to have been at the time
of the alleged offense, and that the defendant
was there. The other testifies that he was at
the place of the alleged offense at the time of
commission, and the defendant was not there.
Under rule 12.1(b) the defendant will have to
provide the names and addresses of both types
of witnesses, since he will rely on them to es-
tablish his alibi. According to the Wardius
rule, the government should then disclose the
names and addresses of witnesses whom it will
use in its "refutation of the very pieces of evi-
dence which [the defendant] disclosed to the
state." 30 Thus, the Court mandated disclosure
of witnesses who will contradict the alibi by
rebutting the testimony of either one or both
types of witnesses. 31 However, rule 12.1(b)
only requires the government to provide the
identity of the witnesses which it will use to
"establish defendant's presence at the scene of
the alleged offense." as In other words, if the
defendant intends to establish his alibi using a
witness who will testify that the defendant was
with him, and not at the scene of the crime, rule
12.1(b) does not require the government to
disclose the identity of the witness it will use
for direct rebuttal. This lack of reciprocity
30 412 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added).
31 See Nakell, Due Process, supra note 4, at
62-66. Professor Nakell notes that the witnesses
which the government will use to indirectly rebut
the evidence of alibi will probably already be part
of the government's evidence in chief at trial, since
they would tend to establish that the defendant
committed the crime. So if the defendant makes
any disclosures of evidence, whether of tangible
evidence under rule 16 or identity of witnesses, the
Wardius rule requires disclosure of any evidence
which the government would use to show that the
defendant committed the crime. This technique of
disclosing a small amount of alibi evidence in
order to obtain almost complete discovery of the
government's case is a tactical advantage only to
the extent that it allows discovery which is
broader than that under rule 16. The limits of the
reciprocity doctrine which compels the government
disclosure have not yet been defined by the courts.
Cases could be hypothesized in which, as a result
of the defendant's technique, the government must
provide evidence currently not subject to disclo-
sure under rule 16, such as statements made by
government witnesses or prospective government
witnesses.
32 Amendments, supra note 1, at 292. The gov-
ernment cannot prove the defendant's presence by
sole reliance on direct rebuttal evidence, for this
would only show that the defendant was not at the




leaves the defendant subject to surprise, in vio-
lation of his due process rights as discussed in
Wardius.33
The second constitutional problem which re-
mains is possible infringement upon sixth
amendment rights if the penalty of rule 12.1 is
imposed.3 4  The applicability of the sixth
amendment is especially evident with regard to
this rule, since the penalty for its violation, al-
though discretionary, provides for the exclu-
sion of the testimony of witnesses who were
not disclosed to the prosecution.3 5 The sixth
amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecu-
tions the accused shall enjoy the right ...to
have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor. . .. ,,36 The first case
which went beyond the literal interpretation
that the words of the sixth amendment give
the accused the right to obtain witnesses, but
not necessarily to interrogate them, is Wash-
ington v. Texas.3 7 The Court explained that
the rights guaranteed by that amendment in-
33 The defendant may attempt to circumvent this
limitation by moving for a court order compelling
disclosure of witnesses whom the government will
use for direct rebuttal, on the grounds that the
lack of reciprocity is "good cause" for an excep-
tion to the requirements of the rule. Amendments,
supra note 1, at 293. The "good cause" is sup-
ported by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
which stated the defendant's right to exculpatory
evidence in the hands of the government. Such an
order might not be granted because of restrictions
which have been imposed on the Brady rule by the
courts. See Comment, Discovery in Criminal
Cases: Denial to Misdemeanants as a Violation of
Due Process and Equal Protection, 65 J. CRIm. L.
& C. 181, 184-85 (1974).
34 We emphasize that this case does not in-
volve the question of the validity of the
threatened sanction, had petitioner chosen not to
comply vith the notice-of-alibi rule. Whether
and to what extent a State can enforce dis-
covery rules against a defendant who fails to
comply, by excluding relevant, probative evi-
dence is a question raising Sixth Amendment
issues which we have no occasion to explore.
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83 n.14 (1970).
Justice Brennan noted the possibility of constitu-
tional problems with such exclusion in Palermo v.
U ited States, 360 U.S. 343, 363, 365-66 (1959)
(Brennan, J., concurring in result).
35 Amendments, supra note 1, at 292.
36 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
37 388 U.S. 14 (1967). See Comment, Constitu-
tional Infirmities of the Revised Illinois Rules of
Criminal Discovery, 7 JoHN MAR. J. PRAc. &
PRoc. 364 (1974) ; Note, The Preclusion Sanction
-A Violation of the Constitutional Right to Pre-
sent a Defense, 81 YALE L.J. 1342 (1972) (herein-
after cited as Preclusion Sanction).
elude "[tihe right to offer the testimony of
witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if
necessary, [which] is in plain terms the right
to present a defense.... 38
In the Washington case the defendant's co-
participant in the offense, who had already
been convicted and sentenced, was not allowed
to testify for the defendant under the Texas
law denying admission of such testimony,
based on its presumed untrustworthiness,3 9
even though the record indicated that the testi-
mony would have been exculpatory and mate-
rial to the defense. Mr. Chief Justice Warren,
speaking for eight members of the Court, said
that the sixth amendment right was a funda-
mental element of due process as ipplied to the
states via the fourteenth amendment :40
[T]he petitioner in this case was denied his
right to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor because the state arbi-
trarily denied him the right to put on the stand
a witness who was physically and mentally ca-
pable of testifying to events that he had per-
sonally observed and would have been relevant
and material to the defense.41
In order to determine the impact of Wash-
ington upon exclusion sanctions, such as the
one in rule 12.1, two other elements of its ra-
tionale must be examined. First, the mandatory
ban on testimony of a category of witnesses
made the Texas statute violative of the sixth
38388 U.S. at 19 (emphasis added). Accord,
Holloway v. Wolff, 351 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Neb.
1972) ; State v. Grant, 519 P.2d 261 (Wash. 1974)
(exclusion of defendant's alibi witness was uncon-
stitutional since it denied him the right to have
testimony in his own behalf).
39 VERxoNr's ANN. Trx. PEN. CODE, art. 82;
TEx. CODE CRIm. P., art. 711 (1925) (now VERNON'S
ANN. TEx. CODE CRIm. P., art. 36.09 (1965)).
40 388 U.S. at 19.
41 Id. at 23 (emphasis added). The evidentiary
requirements which generally apply to a witness'
testimony are not changed by this ruling. Before a
sixth amendment constitutional violation can be
raised following the imposition of the exclusion
sanction of rule 12.1, the excluded testimony must
be shown to be otherwise admissible. The testi-
mony of the defendant's witness must be relevant
and material to his case. This test is easily met,
since a witness which the defendant will use to es-
tablish that he was elsewhere at the time of the
crime is relevant to his alibi defense which, in
turn, is probably material to his entire defense. In
addition, other evidentiary requirements such as
personal observation of the witness, and sufficient
physical and mental capacity of the witness to ob-
serve are not altered.
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amendment because it completely barred co-de-
fendants from being defense witnesses. 42 The
sanction of rule 12.1 (e), on the other hand, is
not mandatory but permissive. The judge may
decide to exclude the witness, unless "cause" is
shown for failure to comply with the discovery
provisions.43 To the extent that whole catego-
ries of defense witnesses are not necessarily
prevented from testifying, the Washington case
is not directly applicable to rule 12.1.
4 4
Second, the Court mentions that the exclu-
sion mandated by the Texas statute arbitrarily
denied the defendant his right to put a witness
on the stand. After stating that making all de-
fense testimony inadmissible for reasons of
procedure would be unconstitutional, the Court
continues: "It is difficult to see how the Con-
stitution is any less violated by arbitrary rules
that prevent whole categories of defense wit-
nesses from testifying on the basis of a priori
categories that presume them unworthy of
belief."45 An arbitrary rule is irrational, and
an indication of its irrationality is the irration-
ality of the presumption on which it is based.
In the Washington case, there was no rational
connection between the presumed fact of un-
trustworthiness and the status of the defense
witness as a co-defendant, which would justify
an irrebuttable presumption of untrustwor-
thiness. 4 . In the Court's words, "[T]he rule
42 VERNON'S ANN. TEx. PEN. CODE, art. 82.
43 The Advisory Committee explains that the
use of the term "may" in rule 12.1(e) is intended
to show that a requirement of "cause" is necessary
before the testimony can be admitted. "This is fur-
ther emphasized by subdivision (f), which pro-
vides for exceptions whenever 'good cause' is
shown for the exception." Amendments, supra note
I, at 294 (Advisory Committee Notes).
44 Accord, State ex rel. Simos v. Burke, 41
Wis. 2d 129, 138-40, 163 N.W.2d 177, 181-82
(1968). The court held the Wisconsin notice of
alibi statute, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 955.07, did not
conflict with the ruling of the Washington case,
because it was not an absolute ban on testimony of
certain categories of defense witnesses. Contra,
Preclusion Sanction, supra note 37, at 1347-49.
The commentator did not take into account the re-
strictions placed upon the holding of Washington
by the facts of the case, and read it as a bar to
the use of any exclusion sanction. Moreover, he
did not mention the qualifying use of the word
"arbitrary" in the Court's holding.
45 388 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added).
46 This rational connection test was used subse-
quently in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36
(1969), where the Court said:
[a] criminal statutory presumption must be re-
disqualifying an alleged accomplice from testi-
fying on behalf of a defendant cannot even be
defended on the ground that it rationally sets
apart a group of persons who are particularly
likely to commit perjury." 47 Therefore, instead
of just excluding witnesses who would not be
admissible at trial because of their bias, a rule
which fails this rational connection test would
also unconstitutionally exclude witnesses who
would testify truthfully.
The standard used to implement this test in
the Washington case was necessarily a nearly
perfect correlation between the proven fact
that the witness was a co-defendant and the
presumption that the witness was untrust-
worthy.48 However, because the rule 12.1 ex-
clusion sanction is permissive, the presumption
of untrustworthiness on which it is based is
rebuttable. The standard to be used for such a
presumption is at least a greater-than-fifty per
cent,49 but not necessarily perfect, correlation.
Any definitive determination of whether the
rational connection test is satisfied by the rule
would involve the use of empirical data such as
the Court used in Leary v. United States.50 If
the permissive sanction of rule 12.1 could be
shown to exclude truthful testimony of alibi
witnesses more often than it excludes untruthful
testimony, then it would appear to violate the
defendant's sixth amendment right to compul-
sory process. 51
garded as 'irrational' or 'arbitrary' and hence
unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said
with substantial assurance that the presumed
fact is more likely than not to flow from the
proven fact on which it is made to depend.
47 388 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added).
48 Accord, Preclusion Sanction, mtpra note 37,
at 1349-50.49 Ashford & Ringer, Presumptions, Assump-
tions and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A The-
oretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 185 (1969).
50 395 U.S. at 37-53.
51 Sometimes the courts have subsumed the ra-
tional connection standard into one of fairness.
See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
297-98 (1973). The Court said that in cases of
obvious trustworthiness, fundamental fairness could
compel compulsory process to take precedence over
a procedural rule.
The same view is expressed in Hardin v. Es-
telle, 365 F. Supp. 39, 45 (N.D. Tex. 1973). But
see Green v. Estelle, 488 F2d 918 (5th Cir. 1973),
where the state's failure to produce a subpoenaed
witness who was confined at the time of trial was
not error because the defendant failed to call the
subpoenaed witness or move for a continuance or
request a warrant for attachment.
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EXPANSION OF DISCOVERY
A third constitutional issue presented by this
section of the amendments is self-incrimina-
tion. The defendant may decide, subsequent to
mutual disclosure of witnesses and location at
the time of the alleged offense, that he will not
use an alibi defense, possibly because the poor
character reputation of the witnesses would
hinder rather than help his case. If he makes
this decision to refrain from using the alibi de-
fense, then any such information which is ob-
tained as a result of his prior disclosure should
not be introduced into trial because it is self-
incriminating.52 No express provision to that
effect can be found in the amended rules.
Rule 12.2 has the same types of provisions
as rule 12.1, requiring mandatory disclosure of
intent to rely upon a defense of either insan-
ity or mental disease or defect inconsistent
with the mental element required for the of-
fense charged. The penalty for non-compliance
is exclusion of the defense itself, or of the tes-
timony of expert witnesses.53 The first subdivi-
sion requires notice of intent to use the
defense of insanity, but it does not require that
the defendant give names and addresses of the
witnesses he will use to prove his insanity. In
that respect, the defendant is not actually giv-
ing evidence to the prosecution, for which he
would constitutionally expect to receive evi-
dence in return. In addition, application of the
Wardius reciprocity rule is limited by the facts
of its case to situations involving defense dis-
closure of witnesses, not just notice.
However, an argument could be made, based
on language of the Court in Wardius, that
mere notice of a defense, without the opportu-
nity for the defendant to discover prosecution
witnesses, may violate fundamental fairness
and due process notions:
5? The Court in Wardius recognized that the
current rules do not require exclusion of the ini-
tially disclosed items and the evidence derived
from them: "Nor could he retract the information
once provided should it turn out later that the
hoped-for reciprocal discovery rights were not
granted." 412 U.S. at 477. Contra, Radford v.
Stewart, 320 F. Supp. 826, 831 (D.C. Mont.
1970), in which the court saw no problem of self-
incrimination as long as the prosecution did not
make its prima facie case merely from investiga-
tion of the notice and list of witnesses which the
defendant provides. See discussion commencing
with text accompanying note 100 infra.
53 Amendments, supra note 1, at 295. For the
text of rule 12.2 see note 21 supra.
It is fundamentally unfair to require a defend-
ant to divulge the details of his own case
while at the same time subjecting him to the
hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the
very pieces of evidence which he disclosed to
the state .... Thus, in the absence of fair no-
tice that he would have an opportunity to dis-
cover the State's rebuttal witnesses, petitioner
cannot be compelled to reveal his alibi
defense.P
No court has expressly spoken to the due proc-
ess problems in requiring the defendant to give
notice of his insanity defense, without receiv-
ing any reciprocal information from the
prosecution.5 5 Such required information, ac-
cording to a liberal interpretation of the War-
dius rule, would be the identity of the wit-
nesses, especially expert witnesses, upon which
the prosecution would rely to rebut the defense
of insanity. 56 A justification for such a liberal
extension of the Wardius rule is the counter-
balancing of the advantage which the gov-
ernment already has in its investigative
techniques. 7
The sanctions which can be applied for fail-
ure to give notice are twofold: under rule
12.2 (a) the defense itself can be prohibited, or
under rule 12.2 (d) the testimony of an expert
witness on the defendant's mental state can be
excluded. 58 The first sanction is broader than
that of rule 12.1 and conflicts with the strong
dictum of the Washington case, establishing
the right to present a defense. 59 By precluding
the defendant from asserting his defense, the
rule affronts the defendant's sixth amendment
rights.
The alternative sanction of rule 12.2(d) is
54 412 U.S. at 476, 479 (emphasis added).
55 Montana has a similar notice-of-insanity de-
fense rule. Rzv. CODE MONT. § 95-503 (1947).
The Montana courts have not yet dealt with the
constitutional issues involved in this rule. See
State ex rel. Krutzfeldt v. District Ct., 515 P.2d
1312 (Mont. 1973)(defendant could not raise the
constitutional question of lack of reciprocity in the
statute on its face, because it was applied recipro-
cally to him).
56 If the Wardius rule is read narrowly, the re-
ciprocal information would only be notice of the
government's intent to rebut the defendant's insan-
ity defense. Such notice is useless since the defend-
ant will anticipate rebuttal.
57 See Rule 16 Discovery, supra note 4, at
1018-19; text accompanying note 125 infra.
5 Anmendments, supra note 1, at 295.
51 388 U.S. at 19 (dictum).
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more limited than that in rule 12.1. The only
types of witnesses which are excluded are ex-
pert witnesses; the defendant can still bring in
lay witnesses to testify regarding insufficient
mental capacity for the alleged offense.60 More-
over, the defendant may be allowed to subse-
quently use expert witnesses if the government
uses them in rebuttal.61
The rationale for such exclusion is not based
on an irrebuttable presumption of untrustwor-
thiness, as in the Washington case.6 2 If the
failure to give notice is intentional, there is a
possibility that the defendant may be seeking a
sympathetic expert witness who will agree to
commit perjury. However, the defendant may
also not want to disclose such a personal
frailty before trial because of the ensuing
stigma6s  and possible liability for civil
commitment. 64 Moreover, because the use of an
insanity defense is tantamount to an admission
of guilt, the requirement of notice of an insan-
ity defense is harmful to the defendant's case
if he subsequently intends to plead not guilty
and the prosecution is allowed to comment on
the defendant's previous intent to use the
defense. 65 The correlation between defendant's
60 "[H] e will be limited to 'lay' testimony, which
generally is not effective for a defense of mental
disease or defect." REv. CODE MONT. § 95-503
(1947) (Comment). The reason for the ineffective-
ness of the lay testimony is that substantial limi-
tations are placed on the use of laymen to state
observations which embody opinions, such as the
testimony of a mother that her son has been "act-
ing strangely lately," or is "mad." Sometimes, how-
ever, they are admitted as "short hand renditions."
R. McCoRMIcx, EVIDENCE ch. 3, § 11 n.31 (1972).
The courts have not yet gone so far as to equate
effective loss of a defense with denial of the right
to present a defense.
61 REv. CODE MONT. § 95-503 (1947) (Com-
ment). This is only a possibility, since the use of
the exclusion is at the court's discretion. Amend-
ments, supra note 1, at 295.
62 388 U.S. at 20-21. 'See text accompanying
note 46 supra.
G3 Accord, Preclusion. Sanction, supra note 37,
at 1350 n.62 .
64 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244 et seq. (1949);
ILL. RE V STAT. ch. 91Y2, §§ 6-1 et seq. (1971).
G5 Some courts have recognized the prejudicial
effect of the insanity defense on other defenses,
and have consequently recommended severing that
portion of a criminal trial which deals with insan-
ity as a defense. See, e.g., United States v. Greene,
489 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Holmes v.
United States, 363 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Curl v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 474, 162 N.W.2d 77
(1968).
failure to give notice of an insanity defense
and the untrustworthiness of the expert wit-
ness may, as in the case of the exclusion
sanction of rule 12.1, not be sufficient to sat-
isfy the rational connection test 66 and thus the
exclusion sanction would be unconstitutional.
Furthermore, there is no rational basis for the
assumption that the defendant would be more
likely to tamper with an expert than a lay wit-
ness. The reluctance of the Advisory Commit-
tee to exclude all witnesses as a penalty indi-
cates that it both has doubts about the validity
of the rationale for such exclusion, and that it
does not expect lay witnesses to be of much
assistance to the defendant's case. 67 The diffi-
culty remains that the court may exclude some
of the defendant's witnesses without a rational
basis, and to that extent, even though he can
still bring other witnesses to the stand, the de-
fendant is being denied his right to compulsory
process. 68
The self-incrimination problems of rules 12.2
are not as apparent as they are in the notice-
of-alibi provisions. In fact, a distinction has
been made by courts between notice and evi-
dence, in that the transfer of notice does not
provide any factual information which the
prosecution can use against the defendant. 6 In
this respect the notice requirements of rules
12.1 and 12.2 are not violative of the defend-
ant's fifth amendment rights, although other
66 See text accompanying note 51 supra.
67 See note 60 supra.
68 In the Washington case the defendant was
not denied the testimony of all his witnesses, just
the one who would have substantiated his alibi.
Washington v. State, 400 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex.
Cr. App. 1966), rev'd, Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14 (1967). Yet the Supreme Court found this
denial unconstitutional, and implied that the de-
fendant has a right to compulsory process for ob-
taining the testimony of all his witnesses, subject
to the rules of evidence regarding their testimony.
But see State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 23, 210 A.2d
763, 775 (1965) (it is proper to limit or exclude
testimony by a defense psychiatrist whenever the
defendant refuses to be examined by another psy-
chiatrist).
69 See Radford v. Stewart, 320 F. Supp. 826, 829
(D. Mont. 1970); Commonwealth v. Pritchett, 225
Pa. Super. 401, 312 A.2d 434 (1973); Preclusion
Sanction, supra note 37, at 1350-51. This distinction
is also used in limiting the applicability of the
Wardius reciprocity test to relinquishment of evi-




fifth amendment problems may still exist.70
Section (c) of rule 12.2 presents no self-
incrimination problem when viewed in light of
recent Supreme Court cases such as Schinerber
v. California7 l and United States v. Dionisio,7 2
whose rationales would allow the examination
of the defendant by a psychiatrist designated
by the court.
7 3
III. RULE 16-DIscOVERY AND INSPECTION
The most obvious change in the amendment
to rule 16 is the allowance of independent dis-
covery for both prosecution and defense. The
current rule allows prosecutorial discovery
only on the condition that the discovery sought
by the defendant has been granted.74 This fur-
70 See discussion commencing with text accom-
panying note 100 infra for a more complete dis-
cussion of the self-incrimination problems.
71384 U.S. 757 (1966). See text accompanying
note 102 infra.
72 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
73 Accord, State v. Risden, 56 N.J. 516, 264
A.2d 214 (1970); State v. Obstein, 52 N.J. 516,
247 A.2d 5 (1968) ; State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3,
210 A.2d 673 (1965).
74 The full text of amended rule 16 appears
infra. Additions to the language of current rule 16
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are
shown in italics; deletions are shown in brackets.
Because the amended rule has substantially rear-
ranged the current rule, there are changes in the
order of presentation of the provisions which are
not delineated in the text infra.
Rule 16. Discovery and inspection.
(a) Disclosure of evidence by the government.
(1) Information subject to disclosure.
(A) Statement of defendant. Upon request
[motion] of a defendant the government shall
permit [court may order the attorney for the
government to permit] the defendant to in-
spect and copy or photograph: any relevant
written or recorded statements [or confes-
sions] made by the defendant, or copies
thereof, within the possession, custody or con-
trol of the government, the existence of which
is known, or by the exercise of due diligence
may become known, to the attorney for the
government; the substance of any oral state-
ment which the government intends to offer in
evidence at the trial made by the defendant
whether before or after arrest in response to
interrogation by any person then known to the
defendant to be a government agent; and [rel-
evant] recorded testimony of the defendant be-
fore a grand jury which relates to the offense
charged. Where the defendant is a corpora-
tion, partnership, association, or labor union,
the court may grant the defendant, upon its
motion, discovery of relevant recorded testi-
mony of any witness before a grand jury who
was, at the time either of the charged acts or
of the grand jury proceedings, so situated as
an officer or employee as to have been able le-
ther expansion of discovery is an attempt to
offset the great advantage which the govern-
gaily to bind the defendant in respect to the
activities involved in the charges.
(B) Defendant's prior record. Upon request
of the defendant, the government shall furnish
to the defendant such copy of his prior crimi-
nal record, if any, as is then available to the
attorney for the government.
(C) Documents and tangible objects. Upon
request [motion] of the defendant the govern-
ment shall permit [court may order the attor-
ney for the government to permit] the defend-
ant to inspect and copy or photograph books,
papers, documents, photographs, tangible ob-jects, buildings or places, or copies or portions
thereof, which are within the possession, cus-
tody or control of the government, and which
are material [upon a showing of materiality]
to the preparation of his defense or are in-
tended for use by the government as evidence
in chief at the trial, or were obtained from or
belong to the defendant [and that the request
is reasonable].
(D) Reports of examinations and tests. Upon
request [motion] of a defendant the govern-
ment shall permit [the court may order the
attorney for the government to permit] the
defendant to inspect and copy or photograph
any [relevant] results or reports of physical
or mental examinations, and of scientific tests
or experiments, made in connection with the
particular case, or copies thereof, within the
possession, custody or control of the govern-
ment, the existence of which is known, or
by the exercise of due diligence may become
known, to the attorney for the government.
(E) Government witnesses. Upon request of
the defendant the government shall furnish to
the defendant a written list of the names and
addresses of all government witnesses which
the attorney for the government intends to
call in the presentation of the case in chief to-
gether with any record of prior felony convic-
tions of any such witness which is within the
knowledge of the attorney for the government.
When a request for discovery of the names
and addresses of witnesses has been made by
a defendant, the government shall be allowed
to perpetuate the testimony of such witnesses
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 15.
(2) Information not subject to disclosure. Ex-
cept as provided in paragraphs (A), (B),
and (D) of subdivision (a) (1) [subdivision
(a) (2)], this rule does not authorize the dis-
covery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or
other internal government documents made by
the attorney for the government or other gov-
ernment agents in connection with the investi-
gation or prosecution of this case, or of
statements made by government witnesses or
prospective government witnesses [(other than
the defendant)] except as provided in 18
U.S.C. § 3500.
(3) Grand jury transcripts. Except as pro-
vided in Rule 6 and subdivision (a) (1) (A)
of this rule, these rules do not relate to dis-
covery or inspection of recorded proceedings
of a grand jury.
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ment has enjoyed from its access to superior
investigational resources for constructing a
case against the defendant.
(4) Failure to call witness. The fact that a
witness' name is on a list furnished under this
rule shall not be grounds for comment upon afailure to call the witness.
(b) Disclosure of evidence by the defendant.(1) Information subject to disclosure.
(A) Documents and tangible objects. [If the
court grants relief sought by the defendant
under subdivision (a) (2) of this rule, it
may,] upon request [motion] of the govern-
ment, the defendant shall [condition its order
by requiring that the defendant permit] the
government to inspect and copy or photograph
scientific or medical reports,] books, papers,
documents, photographs, tangible objects, or
copies or portions thereof, which [the defend-
ant intends to produce at the trial and which]
are within the [his] possession, custody or
control of the defendant, [upon a showing of
materiality to the preparation of the govern-
ment's case and that the request is reasona-
ble.] and which the defendant intends to intro-
duce as evidence in chief at the trial.(B) Reports of examinations and tests. Upon
request of the government, the defendant shall
permit the government to inspect and copy or
photograph any results or reports of physical
or mental examinations and of scientific tests
or experiments made in connection with the
particular case, or copies thereof, within the
possession or control of the defendant, which
the defendant intends to introduce as evidence
in chief at the trial or which were prepared
by a witness whom the defendant intends to
call at the trial when the results or reports
relate to his testimony.
(C) Defense witnesses. Upon request of the
governnient, the defendant shall furnish the
government a list of the names and addresses
of the witnesses he intends to call in the pres-
entation of the case in chief. When a requestfor discovery of the names and addresses of
witnesses has been made by the government,
the defendant shall be allowed to perpetuate
the testimony o.f such witnesses in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 15.(2) Information not subject to disclosure. Ex-
cept as to scientific or medical reports, this
subdivision does not authorize the discovery or
inspection of reports, memoranda, or other in-
ternal defense documents made by the defend-
ant, or his attorneys or agents in connection
with the investigation or defense of the case,
or of statements made by the defendant, or by
government or defense witnesses, or by pro-
spective government or defense witnesses, to
the defendant, his agents or attorneys.(3) Failure to call witness. The fact that a
witness' name is on a list furnished under this
rule shall not be grounds for comment upon afailure to call a witness.
[(f) Time of Motions. A motion under this
rule may be made only within 10 days after
arraignment or at such reasonable later time
as the court may permit. The motion shall in-
The amended rule permits defense discov-
ery not only of the defendant's statements, 75
written or recorded, but also allows discovery
dude all relief sought under this rule. A sub-
sequent motion may be made only upon a
showing of cause why such motion would be
in the interest of justice.](c) Continuing duty to disclose. If, [subse-
quent to compliance with an order issued pur-
suant to this rule, and] prior to or during
trial, a party discovers additional evidence or
material previously requested or ordered,
which is subject to discovery or inspection
under this rule, or the identity of an addi-
tional witness or witnesses, he shall promptly
notify the other party or his attorney or the
court of the existence of the additional mate-
rial or witness.
(d) Regulation of discovery.
(1) Protective orders. Upon a sufficient show-
ing the court may at any time order that
the discovery or inspection be denied, re-
stricted or deferred, or make such other order
as is appropriate. Upon request by a party[motion by the government] the court shall
[may] permit the party [government] to
make such showing, in whole or in part, in
the form of a written statement to be in-
Ipected by the judge alone [court in camera].
f the court enters an order granting relief
following such a showing [in camera], the en-
tire text of the party's [government's] state-
ment shall be sealed and preserved in the rec-
ords of the court to be made available to the
appellate court in the event of an appeal [by
the defendant].(2) Failure to comply with a request. If at
any time during the course of the proceedings
it is brought to the attention of the court that
a party has failed to comply with this rule,[or with an order issued pursuant to this
rule] the court may order such party to per-
mit the discovery or inspection [of materials
not previously disclosed,] grant a continuance,
or prohibit the party from introducing [in]
evidence [the material] not disclosed, or it
may enter such other order as it deems just
under the circumstances. [An order of the
court granting relief under this rule shall]
The court may specify the time, place, and
manner of making the discovery and inspec-
tion and may prescribe such terms and condi-
tions as are just.(e) Alibi witnesses. Discovery of alibi wit-
nesses is governed by Rule 121.
Amendments, supra note 1, at 304-06; FED. R.
CRIM. P. 16.
75 Defining the scope of the term "statements"
has consumed much court time since it was first
used in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
and included in the Jencks Act. Fmn. R. Cim. P.
16; Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1970). See
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) for another definition of the
term. Rule 801 (a) of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence gives a definition of "statement" which is
drafted for use with hearsay rule questions. It is
not as informative as those definitions given by the
courts, and to the extent that it includes non-verbal
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of the substance of any oral statement which
was made by the defendant to anyone who he
knew at the time to be an agent of the
government.76 The Supreme Court refused,
however, to extend the defendant's right of
discovery beyond his own statements to those
of his co-defendants or co-conspirators. 77
conduct, the definition is not relevant to discovery.
FD. R. Ev. 801(a)
Some courts have held that the statements must
be substantially verbatim and contemporaneous
(United States v. Elife, 43 F.R.D. 23 (S.D.N.Y.
1967)) or must purport to reproduce his exact
words. United States v. Armantrout, 278 F. Supp.
517 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Others have allowed discov-
ery of documents which, although not verbatim,
set forth the substance of the statements which the
defendant made. United States v. Scharf, 267 F.
Supp. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; United States v. Mor-
rison, 43 F.R.D. 516 (N.D. I1. 1967). (See also
Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85 (1961);
United States v. McMillen, 489 F.2d 229 (7th Cir.
1972); United States v. Black, 282 F. Supp. 35
(C.D. Cal. 1968); United States v. Iovinelli, 276
F. Supp. 629, 631 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
The amended rule does not attempt to provide a
definition for the term, "statements," but it implies
that the definition must be narrow, since discovery
of the substance of the statements of a defendant
is placed in a separate category from the original
statements themselves. Amendments, supra note 1,
at 304-05. See ABA, supra note 4, at 56-63.
76 Amendments, supra note 1, at 304-05; ABA,
supra note 4, at 13.
7 This is one area where expansion has been
attempted by the courts. In United States v. Per-
cevault, 490 F2d 126 (2d Cir. 1974) the district
court allowed discovery by the defendant of his
own statements, the statements of his co-defendant,
and statements of co-conspirators, made during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, which
the government intended to introduce against the
defendant, Percevault, as his own admissions. An
amended order of the trial court allowed discovery
of statements made by co-conspirators after the
termination of the conspiracy when they included a
statement which the government intended to use
against the defendant because it was made by a
co-conspirator in the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy. The government complied with the
orders except where it claimed that disclosure
would conflict with the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. §
3500(a) (1970); thus it did not disclose state-
ments of prospective government witnesses, both
co-defendants and co-conspirators, made after the
termination of the conspiracy.
Judge Weinstein advanced two novel extensions
of rule 16(a) when he said that according to rule
801(d) (2) of the then-proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence the statements of a co-conspirator during
the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy
are exceptions to the hearsay rule, and thus they
should be treated as statements of the defendant
for the purposes of discovery. Secondly, he stated
that the defendant should, in all fairness, be al-
lowed discovery of his co-defendants' statements.
United States v. Percevault, 61 F.R.D. 338,
The amendments made a special adjustment
allowing a defendant corporation to discover
any relevant recorded testimony of a witness
before a grand jury, when the witness is an
officer or employee who could legally bind the
defendant corporation. 8 The requirement of
relevancy does not seem appropriate, when, ac-
cording to the amended rules, the grand jury
testimony of a non-corporate defendant can be
admitted upon a lesser showing of relation to
the offense charged.7 9 In fact, recent cases do
not even require relevancy for discovery of
grand jury testimony by a non-corporate
defendant.80 Neither have they demanded, as
the amended rule does, that the officer or em-
ployee be situated so as to legally bind the de-
fendant, in respect to activities mentioned in the
charges.8'
339-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). On review Judge Kauf-
man disallowed this expansion of discovery be-
cause it went beyond the limits of rule 16(a). 490
F.2d at 130-32.
In their 1970 proposal the Advisory Committee
also recommended disclosure of the co-defendant's
statements. Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure for the United States District Courts,
48 F.R.D. 553, 588 (1970). The recommendation
was not submitted to Congress by the Supreme
Court, and some cases have accordingly denied
disclosure of a co-defendant's statements. See, e.g.,
United States v. Edwards, 42 F.R.D. 605
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
78 Amendments, supra note 1, at 305.
9 Id.
so See, e.g., United States v. Longarzo, 43
F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v.
Gleason, 259 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The
Advisory Committee has codified the view of these
courts, because it replaced the standard of "rele-
vancy" with one of "relation." FED. R. Cijm. P.
16(a) (3). "Relation" implies a mere connection
between two items. Van Schaick v. Marinelli, 276
N.Y.S. 241, 243 App. Div. 7 (1934). See generally
Note, Discovery by a Criminal Defendant of His
Own Grand Jury Testimony, 68 COLUTm. L. REv.
311 (1968).81 See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 413 F2d
1244 (5th Cir. 1969), dismissed as moot .rtb nom.
United States v. Gifford-Hill-American, 397 U.S.
93 (1970); United States v. Anzelmo, 319 F.
Supp. 1106 (E.D. La. 1970).
Some courts have been so liberal as to allow
discovery of grand jury testimony of a corporate
defendant's officers as a matter of right. See, e.g.,
United States v. Stone, 319 F. Supp. 364
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Gleason, 259
F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Others have as-
sembled a need for the testimony from the facts of
the case, without any particular showing. See, e.g.,




The main addition to the section of rule 16
which deals with discovery of documents is the
allowance of inspection and copying of evi-
dence not only if the defendant shows that the
evidence will be material to his defense, but
also if the government intends to use such doc-
uments at trial or if they were obtained from
or belong to the defendant.8 2 The Advisory
Committee suggests that these latter provisions
are actually examples of judicial standards for
proof of materiality.8 3 The disclosure of re-
ports of physical or mental examinations and
scientific tests and experiments, made in
connection with the particular case, is also
mandatory.84
Both the government and the defense will
have substantial discovery of names and ad-
dresses of each other's witnesses. In capital of-
fense cases the government is currently re-
quired to provide the defendant with the names
and addresses of witnesses which it will use at
trial to prove the indictment.8 5 However,
courts have been very reluctant to extend de-
fense discovery of names of witnesses beyond
the limits of the federal statute. 6
One fault of amended rule 16 is that it re-
stricts the discovery opportunities of the de-
fendant to witnesses which the government in-
tends to call in the presentation of the case in
chief. This excludes witnesses whom the gov-
ernment does not intend to call, who might
nevertheless provide important leads to excul-
patory information. 7 Reciprocal discovery of
these witnesses is not compelled under the
Wardius formulation, since the disclosure of
the defendant's witnesses is limited to those
whom he will call at trial. However, an exten-
sion of the Brady v. Maryland due process and
fundamental fairness arguments may mandate
such disclosure, because the evidence which the
witnesses could provide might be exculpatory 88
82 Amendments, supra note 1, at 305.
83 Id. at 312 (Advisory Committee Notes).
84 Id. at 305.
85 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1970).
86 See note 20 supra.
87 See, Note, Discovery of Witness Identity Un-
der Preliminary Proposed Federal Criminal Ride
16, 12 Wt. & MARY L. REv. 603, 618 (1971).
88 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See text accompanying
note 99 inlra. However, the Brady rule may not
extend to witnesses whose testimony may be pri-
marily incriminating, and only derivatively provides
exculpatory evidence. Where there is a doubt as to
The discovery allowed to the defendant is
still severely limited by the Jencks Act, which
is specifically cited in the amended rules8 9 and
current rule 16.0 In the recent case, United
States v. Feinberg, District Court Judge Mar-
shall made an attempt to place the defendant's
right to discovery outside the restrictions of
the Jencks Act.9' The question was whether
the portion of the government witness' state-
ment which contained a statement of the de-
fendant should be disclosed by the government,
based on the required governmental disclosure
of all the defendant's statements according to
rule 16(a). Although the reviewing court
found Judge Marshall's arguments powerful, it
read the language of rule 16(a)(2) strictly
and prohibited discovery of statements made by
the defendant to the prospective government
witness.92 Thus, Jencks Act confrontations are
inevitable under the amended rules, and the
current trend of the courts is to read the
Jencks Act to reduce allowable defense
discovery.9 3
Lastly, if either the government or the de-
fense suspect that disclosure of the names and
addresses of their witnesses will subject them
to probable tampering or harm, they have two
alternatives. Either the testimony of such wit-
nesses can be perpetuated in accordance with
provisions of rule 15, should they later become
unavailable for testimony, or a protective order
denying, restricting, deferring, or otherwise
limiting discovery may be granted upon a suf-
ficient showing.94 The use of the subjective
term, "sufficient showing," reveals that the
"mandatory" rules are ultimately at the discre-
disclosure, the trial court has the discretion to re-
solve the doubt as it desires. Giles v. Maryland,
386 U.S. 66, 80 (1966).
89 Amendments, supra note 1, at 306.
90 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b).
91371 F. Supp. 1205, 1212-15 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd,
502 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1974).
92 502 F.2d at 1182.
93 The harm to the defendant's case by denial of
discovery of his statements within statements of
government witnesses is particularly evident in
cases such as United States v. Kopple, which was
consolidated with Feinberg. The defendant, Kop-
ple, was a seventy-seven year old physician who
claimed he was unable to remember his whereabouts
and activities on the dates alleged in the indictment.
He sought to learn the statements which he
allegedly made to government agents or third
parties so that he could prepare a defense.
94 Amendments, supra note 1, at 305-07.
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tion of the court.95 The Supreme Court omit-
ted a third alternative, listed in the preliminary
draft,96 which would allow the government to
certify that pre-trial disclosure would subject
the witnesses or others to substantial economic
harm or coercion. Such disclosure would then
not be required. Under the expressio unius est
exc usio alterius maxim, this alternative has
not have been subsumed into the protective
order category. The Advisory Committee Notes
as revised by the Court do not provide any ex-
planation for this deletion, which is contrary
to the recommendation of the American Bar
Association.97
Since their initial publication in preliminary
draft, the requirements of rule 16 have been
the subject of much debate and their constitu-
tionality is still in question.9" The expansion of
discovery for the defendant is more a matter
of policy than anything else, although some
courts have held that it should be considered a
matter of right.99 However, the increased dis-
95 Accord, ABA, supra note 4, at 101-02.
90 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for
the United States District Courts, 48 F.R.D. 553,
589-90 (1970).
97 ABA, supra note 4, at 84.98See, e.g., FED. R. Cam!. P. 16 (Advisory
Committee Notes); Preliminary Draft of Pro-
posed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure for the United States District
Courts, 48 F.R.D. 553, 595-610 (1970); Proposed
Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for
the United States District Courts, 39 F.R.D. 69,
277-78 (1966); Discovery in Criminal Cases, 44
F.R.D. 481, 497-506 (1968) (Newman) ; Rezneck,
The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
54 Gao. L.J. 1276, 1276-94 (1966) (detailed analysis
of 1966 amendments, with some comments on their
constitutionality); Traynor, Ground Lost and
Found in Crimnal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv.
228, 247-48 (1964) (discusses constitutional prob-
lems with expansion of prosecutorial discovery);
Wright, Proposed Changes in Federal Civil, Crimi-
nal and Appellate Procedure, 35 F.R.D. 317, 327-
28 (1964) ; Zagel and Carr, State Criminal Discov-
ery and the New Illiwis Rules, 1971 ILL. L.F. 557,
582-88 (1971) (discusses the constitutionality of
the ABA standards and Illinois rules, which are
somewhat similar to the federal amendments);
Rule 16 Discovery, supra note 4; Note, Constitu-
tionality of Conditional Mutual Discovery under
Federal Rule 16, 19 OxLA. L. Rav. 417 (1966).
99 See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963) (defendant has a right to evidence which
is favorable to him and material to his guilt or
punishment); Thomas v. United States, 343 F.2d
49, 53 (9th Cir. 1965) (a conviction cannot stand
where a prosecutor has, either wilfully or negli-
covery recommended for the prosecution comes
dangerously close to infringement of fifth and
sixth amendment protections. The problems re-
late basically to four areas: the privilege
against self-incrimination, the attorney-client
and work-product privileges, due process and
fundamental fairness, and compulsory process
for the attendance of witnesses.
Self-Incrimination
One of the most elementary objections to a
disclosure of evidence by the defendant is that
he is aiding the prosecution in its case against
him, in disregard of his fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination.109 The Supreme
Court has not endorsed this broad interpreta-
tion. Even in light of liberal constructions
given to the fifth amendment in previous
cases,1 0' the Court in Schmerber v. California
refused to extend the scope of the privilege to
physical evidence obtained from the defendant,
such as a blood sample.
The distinction which has emerged, often ex-
pressed in different ways, is that the privilege
is a ban against compelling "communications"
or "testimony," but that compulsion which
makes a suspect or accused the source of "real
gently, withheld material evidence favorable to the
defendant).
109 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. Justices Black and
Douglas have been consistent exponents of the
privilege against self-incrimination, keenly aware
of the violations which are imminent on any dis-
covery proceeding. Speaking of the fifth amend-
ment, Justice Black wrote: "If words are to be
given their plain and obvious meaning, that provi-
sion, in my opinion, states that a criminal defend-
ant cannot be required to give evidence, testimony,
or any other assistance to the State to aid it in
convicting him of crime." Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 111 (1969)(Black, J., dissenting).
Justice Douglas sounded his support for inde-
pendent discovery and noted fifth amendment vio-
lations under any other system when he said:
To deny a defendant the opportunity to dis-
covery-an opportunity not withheld from
defendants who agree to prosecutorial discov-
ery or from whom discovery is not sought-
merely because the defendant chooses to exer-
cise the constitutional right to refrain from
self-incrimination arguably imposes a penalty
upon the exercise of that fundamental privi-
lege.
Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure for the United States District Courts, 39
F.R.D. 69, 277 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).




or physical evidence" does not violate [the
fifth amendment].102
As the Court noted in Schmerber, though cer-
tain evidence is incriminating, and testimonial
or communicative, its disclosure must be com-
pelled before the fifth amendment privilege can
be evoked.1 0 3
Given this restriction, "testimonial" and
"communicative" must be defined. Clearly a
statement by the defendant is an item of com-
munication and thus protected by the
privilege.10 4 For this reason, any statements
made by the defendant to anyone, or by a gov-
ernment witness to the defendant, his agents,
or attorney, are excluded from the ambit of the
government's discovery in rule 16.105 Scientific
or medical reports are included since these are
the types of records which would usually con-
tain only information of a non-testimonial na-
ture.
The defendant may still be compelled to give
testimonial or communicative evidence under
the amended rule, however. The Court in
Schmerber mentioned that some tests or exper-
iments like lie detectors, although seeming to
obtain merely nontestimonial evidence, may ac-
tually compel testimonial responses.1 0 0 Further-
more, the definitions of "statements" given by
the courts vary.10 7 Thus 'there may be situa-
tions in which an accurate, but not necessarily
contemporaneous or verbatim reconstruction of
what the defendant said to a person is not a
102 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1965). See 8 J. WIG-
toRE, EVIDENCE § 2265 (3d ed. 1940) for one of
the first attempts at distinguishing non-testimonial
evidence from that which is communicative or tes-
timonial. The author limits testimonial evidence to
that which comes directly from the person's lips.
However, the Schmerber Court explicitly dis-
claims adoption of the Wigmore formulation. 384
U.S. at 763 n.7.
103 Accord, Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
444-45 (1974). This is because constitutional rights
can be voluntarily waived. Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 242 (1969) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 467-68 (1938).
The following standard for compulsion has been
suggested by the Supreme Court: "[A person has
the right] to remain silent unless he chooses to
speak in the unfettered exercise of his own free
will and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence."
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (dictum).
104 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
763-64 (1965).
105 Amendments, supra note 1, at 307.
o106 384 U.S. at 764 (dictum).
107 See note 75 supra.
statement.10 The Advisory Committee does
not address the possibility that this evidence
may be compelled under amended rule 16 in
violation of the fifth amendment.
Any document prepared by the defendant is
communicative if it is used to obtain its sub-
stance, as opposed to exemplars such as voice
or handwriting.10 9 It is not clear that amended
rule 16(b)(2) would exclude all such docu-
ments from discovery as "internal defense doc-
uments." Some documents made prior to the
commencement of any adversary proceeding
might not be classified as "made in connection
with the investigation or defense of the
case." 110 To the extent that the amended rule
permits government discovery of these docu-
ments, it arguably violates the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.
One commentator has suggested that any
segment of the discovery process which re-
quires the defendant to communicate with the
prosecution would violate his privilege, includ-
ing informing the prosecutor of the existence
or location of evidence or tendering a list of
witnesses which the defendant intends to
los For example the defendant may make state-
ments to a Welfare Department employee, who
records these statements in his record of the de-
fendant. The files of the employee are admissible
in a civil case under the business records exception
to the hearsay rule. Kelley v. Wasserman, 5
N.Y.2d 425, 185 N.Y.S.2d 538, 158 N.E.2d 241
(1959). Cf. Yates v. Bair Transport, Inc., 249 F.
Supp. 681, 682-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), which pro-
vides an excellent summary of the business records
exception to the hearsay rule. There the court also
cites a case which justified the admissibility of a
defendant's testimony, included in a business rec-
ord, because it was an admission by a party. Id. at
685.
The business entry may thus be a record of the
defendant's testimony, and its admission into evi-
dence can be violative of his fifth amendment priv-
ilege if the testimony is incriminating. It is proba-
ble, in light of the conflicting definitions of
"statements," in the context of the discovery rules(see note 75 supra), that this testimonial or com-
municative evidence which originated with the de-
fendant might not be excluded from discovery
under amended rule 16(b) (2).
10 One's voice and handwriting are, of course,
means of communication . . . [but] a mere
handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content
of what is written, like the voice or body itself,
is an identifying physical characteristic outside
its [the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination] protection.
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 262, 266-67 (1966).
110 Amendments, supra note 1, at 307.
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use."' The argument is engaging, but has been
rejected by courts on the ground that because
the evidence will later be brought up by the
defendant in court, he will be waiving his
privilege with respect to it."1 The discovery,
therefore, would merely advance the waiver of
privilege and ultimate disclosure of evidence.
The Supreme Court in Williams v. Florida
said that such an acceleration of disclosure of
defense material is not unconstitutional when
caused by an alibi-defense rule.113 Proponents
of greater disclosure by the defense, on the
other hand, have suggested that such disclosure
will generally be of information which must be
exculpatory to the defendant, since it is in his
possession. This argument overlooks that neu-
tral or even exculpatory evidence can be made
incriminating in the hands of a skilled
attorney."14
In summary, there seem to be no fifth
amendment violations if the defendant is com-
pelled to disclose evidence which he will later
use at trial, even though this evidence either is
or could be made to be incriminating. How-
111 Ride 16 Discovery, supra note 4, at 1003-04.
See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83-84
(1969).
112 See, e.g., State v. Grove, 65 Wash. 2d 525,
398 P.2d 170 (1965); People v. Lopez, 60 Adv.
Cal. 171, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963);
Jones v. Superior Ct., 58 Cal. 2d 56, 373 P.2d 919,
22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962). Nevertheless, self-in-
crimination problems may still arise if the defend-
ant subsequently decides not to use the evidence at
court. See text accompanying note 115 infra.
113 Nothing in the Fifth Amendment privilege
entitles a defendant as a matter of constitu-
tional right to await the end of the State's case
before announcing the nature of his defense,
any more than it entitles him to await thejury's verdict on the State's case-in-chief be-
fore deciding whether or not to take the stand
himself.
399 U.S. at 85. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 507 (1947) (discovery simply advances the
time of disclosure of evidence).
114 The Supreme Court recognized this ability
of an attorney in Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S.
605, 609-10 (1972), when it said, with regard to
witnesses:
Although a defendant will usually have some
idea of the strength of his evidence, he cannot
be absolutely certain that his witnesses will
testify as expected or that they will be effec-
tive on the stand. They may collapse under
skillful and persistent cross-examination, and
through no fault of their own they may fail to
impress the jury as honest and reliable wit-
nesses.
See Nakell, Discovery, stpra note 4, at 500-01.
ever, if the defendant, after disclosing the evi-
dence to the prosecution, decides that he will
not use the evidence at trial, there are no pro-
visions in the amended rules which require the
evidence itself or any derivative evidence to be
withheld." 5 In such a case the prosecution
would not merely be compelling the defendant
to advance his waiver of privilege; he would
be compelling disclosure of incriminating evi-
dence, which, if testimonial or communicative,
would be in violation of the fifth amendment.
Attorney-Client Privilege
Another claim made by those in opposition
to amended rule 16, and to disclosure by the
defendant in general, is that any divulgence of
information assembled by the defendant and
his attorney is a breach of the common law at-
torney-client privilege."26 The limits of the
privilege, however, reduce the possibility of its
infringement. It only applies to information of
a communicative nature and not to facts which
the attorney may obtain for the benefit of his
client.11 7 Hickman v. Taylor, which dealt with
1 5 See note 52 supra. Perhaps, the defendant
could make a sufficient showing under amended
rule 16(d) (1) which would convince the court to
order that evidence be withheld since the defend-
ant did not effectively waive the privilege with re-
spect to these items. But constitutional guarantees
should not depend on probabilities or possibilities.
These precious rights [privilege against self-
incrimination and right to assistance of coun-
sel] were fixed in our Constitution only after
centuries of persecution and struggle. And in
the words of Chief Justice Marshall, they
were secured '. .. for ages to come and ***
designed to approach immortality as nearly as
human institutions can approach it.' [citation
omitted]
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966).
To safeguard the defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination, the amended rules should con-
tain a requirement to withold evidence already dis-
closed if the defendant subsequently decides not to
use it at trial.
116 Dean Wigmore defined the attorney-client
privilege as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought(2) from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such (3) the communications re-
lating to that purpose (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client (6) are at his instance per-
manently protected (7) from disclosure by
himself or by the legal adviser (8) except the
protection be waived.
8 J. WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (3d ed. 1940).
See Chirac v. Reinecker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 280,
294-95 (1826).
117 Accord, e.g., United States v. Goldfarb, 328
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the work-product privilege in civil litigation,
helps to delineate the scope of the attorney-
client privilege.
[T]he protective cloak of this privilege does
not extend to information which an attorney
secures from a witness while acting for his
client in anticipation of litigation. Nor does
this privilege concern the memoranda, briefs,
communications and other writings prepared
by counsel for his own use in prosecuting his
client's case; and it is equally unrelated to
writings which reflect an attorney's mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories.1l8
The amended rule 16 does not require disclo-
sure of the defendant's own statement, includ-
ing those made to his attorney," 9 and to this
extent it protects the privilege.
Should some memoranda of the attorney sum-
marizing or noncontemporaneously recording
the statements of the defendant not fall within
the definition of "statements," the amendments
further protect the defendant by removing
from required discovery ". . . reports, memo-
randa, or other internal defense documents
made by the defendant, or his attorneys or
agents in connection with the investigation of
the case." 120 This exclusion safeguards the
work-product privilege which was derived
from Hickman, and is also part of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.' 21 The privilege cov-
ers items which the attorney used in connec-
tion with the preparation of his case, such as
memoranda, private impressions, and communi-
cations. To be protected by the work-product
privilege, such items must have been prepared
with the idea of being used at trial.1 22
F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1964) ; Leve v. General Motors
Corp., 43 F.R.D. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; People v.
Speck, 41 Ill. 2d 177, 242 N.E.2d 208 (1968),
rev'd in, part on other grounds, 403 U.S. 946
(1971).
11s 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947). However, some of
these areas are now covered by the "work-prod-
uct" privilege.
179 Amendments, supra note 1, at 307.
120 Id.
121F. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3). See, e.g., Puerto
Rico v. Steamship Zoe Colocotroni, 61 F.R.D. 653,
658 (D.C. P.R. 1974). For an analysis of the ra-
tionale behind the work-product doctrine and the
merits of various definitions of its scope, see Note,
"Work Product" in Criminal Discovery, 1966
WASH. U.L.Q. 321, 334-44.
122 Zenith Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121
The amendments to rule 16 codify the cur-
rent definitions of the attorney-client and
work-product privileges and do not raise any
other common law privilege problems.
Amended section 16(b) (2) is essentially the
same as the current rule, and there have been




The third constitutional test which must be
satisified by these discovery amendments is due
process and fundamental fairness. When these
fifth amendment safeguards are applied, a bal-
ancing test is traditionally used, weighing the
government's interests against those of the
defendant. 1 24 The interests of the government
are in promoting effective law enforcement by
preventing undue surprise to the prosecution at
trial, and in facilitating procurement of evi-
dence while it is still fresh. Those of the de-
fendant can be summarized as attempting to
insure that his trial and the events leading up
to it and after it are "fundamentally fair."
The government has an arsenal of discovery
devices which are not available to the defend-
ant, including the search warrant, the power to
make reasonable searches and seizures without
warrant," 5 and, because of its status as a law
F. Supp. 792, 795 (D.C. Del. 1954). The policy
reasons for the work-product privilege are excel-
lently summarized by the American Bar Associa-
tion Committee on Pre-Trial Proceedings:
To preserve the value engendered by the dif-
ference in perspective of opposing advocates,
serious attention must be given to the dangers
of dulling this perspective if the competitive
spirit is dampened by the knowledge that all
ideas and notions which occur to the advocate
must be shared, on a continuing basis, with
opposing counsel.
ABA, supra note 4, at 89.
123 The Advisory Committee found that the pro-
vision had been sufficiently without challenge that
they recommended retaining its form as in the last
sentence in Rule 16(c). They made no further
comments. Amendments, supra note 1, at 317 (Ad-
visory Committee Notes). See Zagel and Carr,
supra note 98, at 585-87.
124 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers,
377 U.S. 288, 307-08, on remand, 277 Ala. 89, 167
So. 2d 171 (1964) (alternative means test); Bates
v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (compelling
state interest test) ; Preclusion Sanction, supra note
37, at 1360-61; Rule 16 Discovery, supra note 4,
at 1009.
15 See Nakell, Due Process, supra note 4, at




enforcement agency, the "arm of the law" has
the muscle to secure voluntary cooperation
with its efforts. 26 In light of these advantages,
expansion of discovery rights for the defendant
should be encouraged until the imbalance is
corrected.1
27
The amended rules reflect an expansion of
discovery rights for the defendant; however,
this attempt at correction of the imbalance in
discovery rights is offset by an increase in dis-
covery allowed to the government. In other
words, the government still has the effective
advantage.'128 For example, in the amended
rules, the government is given the right to ob-
tain a list of the names and addresses of the
witnesses which the defendant intends to use
in this case. 12 9 Even though the defendant is
allowed to perpetuate the testimony of the wit-
nesses in order to prevent their testimony from
being altered by government persuasion, 2 0 this
120The American Bar Association Committee
on Pre-Trial Proceedings, along with its recom-
mendations to extend discovery, which are more
expansive than the amended rules, said, "It is
clear, however, that even with the expansion of
the rights of accused, the defendant in a criminal
case does not enjoy every advantage or more ad-
vantages than the state." ABA, sapra note 4, at
43.
127 But cf. Note, Developments in the Law of
Discovery, 74 HA~v. L. Rxv. 940 (1961), in which
the commentator states, "In any event, it would
seem that the question of the desirability of crimi-
nal discovery ought not to turn solely upon a close
balancing of procedural advantages." Id. at 1063.
128 Due process notions demand that even if the
scope of discovery is equal for both prosecution
and defense, the effective advantage should lie
with the defendant. As Professor Nakell wrote,
Taking Wardius in conjunction with the
Giles-Brady disclosure requirement, due proc-
ess would not seem to be limited to strictly
tit-for-tat discovery because the limitations on
prosecutorial discovery are founded in part on
constitutional policies not applicable to the de-
fendant.
Nakell, Due Process, supra note 4, at 70.
129 Aendments, supra note 1, at 306.
130 The amendment is not clear as to when such
a perpetuation right may be exercised by the de-
fendant. If he must comply with the request for
names and addresses of the witnesses before the
perpetuation can be effected, then the possibilities
for witness tampering are still present. If the de-
fendant can perpetuate the witnesses' testimonies
before disclosure of their identities, then the gov-
ernment still has the advantage in access to rec-
ords, including those of criminal offenses, to begin
investigation of the character of the witnesses in
an attempt to show that their testimonies are un-
reliable.
provision does not remove the government's
advantage of having already made the initial
contact with most of the witnesses at the time
of the police or F.B.I. report, and therefore
having the ability to commence interviewing
the witnesses before the defendant. In the in-
terviewing process, the government will also
have a greater influence over the witnesses. It
may therefore be unfair to compel the defense
to submit names of the witnesses which it will
use, witnesses who probably would recount the
facts as viewed by the defendant, because of
the possibility of government influence and in-
timidation.
In recognition of the possible unfairness of
expanding discovery equally for both prosecu-
tion and defense, some commentators have
argued that there should be a return to condi-
tional discovery, 31 under which the government
is not entitled to receive any disclosure from
the defendant until it initially gives the infor-
mation which the defendant requests.' 3 2 Such a
'31 See, e.g., Note, Constitutionality of Condi-
tional Mutual Discovery Under Rule 16, 19 OxLA.
L. REv. 417, 424 (1966). This note recognized that
before the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
were amended in 1966, the government's discovery
from the defendant was conditioned upon its prior
compliance with the defendant's request for discov-
ery. The current rules allow, but do not require,
defense discovery, and permit the court to condi-
tion defense discovery on release of information to
the government.
Another alternative might be to condition dis-
covery by either side upon their disclosure of evi-
dence. The parties could present their requests for
evidence to each other, and file copies with the
court. Then evidence would not be released to ei-
ther side until all of the requested items had been
submitted to the court. This would allow the de-
fendant to withhold evidence, if he so desired, in
order to counteract the government's inherent ad-
vantage of investigative machinery. However, not
only is this unfair to the government by perpetuat-
ing the "poker game" aspects of discovery, but
also the defendant's advantage might disappear,
since the withholding of evidence would also be
available to the prosecution. In addition, there
would be disadvantages to the machinery of jus-
tice, more time would be required, and the judge
would have to foresee the arguments of both the
prosecution and the defense so that he could clas-
sify the information properly. See Nakell, Discov-
ery, supra note 4, at 460-61.
Although a sanction of refusal to permit discov-
ery by the defendant until he consents to the
prosecution's discovery request does not violate
sixth amendment guarantees, it would present
problems of due process.
132 The advantage of the government lies both
in the means by which it can obtain evidence re-
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drastic reversion is not necessary. As long as
the defendant has the opportunity to compel
disclosure from the government, the basic
rights of the government to obtain disclosure,
in the interest of fairness, need not be subordi-
nate to those of the defendant. Nor does in-
crease in the discovery rights afforded to the
defendant with a corresponding decrease in
prosecutorial discovery provide a fair solution
for the prosecution. It would perpetuate the
"sporting event" or "poker game" aspects of
discovery. The best remedy was chosen by the
Advisory Committee. Since the investigative
advantages of the government may not have an
impact in all cases, and they cannot feasibly be
given to the defendant because they are inher-
ent in the powers of a law enforcement
agency, the best way to handle alleged unfair-
ness is on a case-by-case basis. The amend-
ment, by allowing for protective orders 33 as in
current rule 16(e), provides the mechanism
for denying government discovery of certain
items, such as the identity of witnesses who
may be in danger of physical harm or
intimidation.13 4 While such an order will cor-
rect the unfairness, its issuance is at the dis-
cretion of the court.235 To more fully protect
the defendant by reducing this discretion, a
statement should be placed in the amended
rules or comments to rule 16 which would ex-
plicitly include within the scope of "sufficient
showing" a demonstration of how the inherent
governmental investigative advantages have
prevented the defendant from adequately pre-
paring his defense prior to trial.
Compulsory Process
The final constitutional issue presented by
amended rule 16 involves the sixth amendment
guarantee of compulsory process for the at-
lating to a crime, and the aura of authority or sta-
tus which induces "voluntary" cooperation. One of
the rationales for conditional discovery is that
since the basis for the government's superiority
cannot be categorized on an item-by-item basis, a
fine analysis should not be attempted and the gov-
ernment's opportunity to obtain evidence should be
conditioned upon the exercise of the defendant's
opportunity, plus a delivery to him of the material
requested.
133 Amendments, supra note 1, at 307.
'34 FED. R. Cram. P. 16(e) (Advisory Commit-
tee Notes).
135 Amendments, supra note 1, at 307.
tendance of witnesses. The sanctions for fail-
ure to disclose evidence required by amended
rule 16 are essentially the same as those in
rule 12.1.138 Amended rule 16 itself, and the
Advisory Committee's comments thereto, do
not expressly give the court the power to ex-
clude the testimony of witnesses whose names
have not been disclosed.13 7 Using the ejusdem
generis maxim of statutory interpretation, the
power to exclude the testimony of the wit-
nesses may come under the power to "...
enter such other order as it deems just under
the circumstances. . . ." Such an exclusion
would arguably be unconstitutional in light of
previous discussion. 3 9
The trial court presently has the power to
exclude documents and other tangible objects
which should have been, but were not, disclosed
upon request of the government prior to the
trial. This exclusionary rule has been in effect
since 1966 and has not provoked constitutional
challenge; therefore, it was included, without
alteration, in the amended rule. 40 However,
some commentators' 4' have argued that the
strong dictum of the Washington case compels
the conclusion that the right to compulsory
process encompasses the right to present tangi-
ble evidence which is material and relevant to
the defendant's case.
136 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
137 Amendments, supra note 1, at 317 (Advisory
Committee Notes). The comments of the Advisory
Committee merely state that the amended sanctions
are the same as the old ones. The earlier com-
ments of the Advisory Committee when rule
16(g) was introduced also shed no light on the
matter, except to say that ". . the second sen-
tence gives wide discretion to the court in dealing
with the failure of either party to comply with a
discovery order." Second Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Criminal
Procedure for the United States District Courts,
34 F.R.D. 411, 455-56 (1964).
Cases speaking to the issue have only repeated
that the remedies are within the broad discretion
of the court. See, e.g., Hansen v. United States,
393 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1968)(trial court has dis-
cretion to admit competent evidence not disclosed
to defendant).
138 Amendments, supra note 1, at 307.
139 See discussion commencing with text accom-
panying note 34 supra.
140 Amendments, supra note 1, at 307.
141 See Comment, Constitutional Infirmities of
the Revised Illinois Rules of Criminal Discovery,
supra note 37, at 390-91; Precusion Sanction,
supra note 37, at 1350-53.
[Vol. 66
EXPANSION OF DISCOVERY
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses,
and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is
in plain terms the right to present a defense,
the right to present the defendant's version of
the facts as well as the prosecution's to the
jury so it may decide where the truth lies.142
Although there may be some logical justifica-
tion for extending the Washington rule to in-
clude compulsory process for the production of
documents, the courts have only required proc-
ess for witnesses. When the issue is actually
due process, the extension of the sixth amend-
ment language to include documents as well as
witnesses seems to strain the constitutional
provision.143 In this regard, it is better argued
that the exclusion of the evidence from trial
and the resulting infringement of the accused's
defense must be balanced against the interests
of the government in using the exclusion sanc-
tion. When the prosecution's interest in avoid-
ing surprise at trial is not compelling,'4 4 and
can be satisfied by alternative means, 4 5 the
infringement of the defendant's due process
rights is unconstitutional. 4 6 The exclusion
142 388 U.S. at 19 (dictum).
143 388 U.S. at 24-25 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
There is a problem of due process denial whenever
a procedural defect prevents the defendant from
presenting evidence to the court, especially if the
prosecution can use the evidence for its own bene-
fit if it so desires. There is no valid governmentjustification for denying the use of such evidence
when, after a continuance, the government could
recover from any surprise which may have ham-
pered its prosecution. Moreover, there are alterna-
tive means available to remedy the situation, and
in fact, they are provided in the amended rules:
an order to permit discovery or inspection, a grant
of continuance, or any other order which the court
deems just. Amendments, supra note 1, at 307.
144 See Preclusion Sanction, supra note 37, at
1355.
145 See Rule 16 Discovery, supra note 4, at
1010-11.
140See Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967),
sanction of amended rule 16(d) (2) is there-
fore arguably unconstitutional to the extent
that the defendant's witnesses can be excluded
in violation of sixth amendment guarantees,
and to the extent that the exclusion of tangible
evidence infringes on due process.
IV. CONCLUSION
The amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure represent a significant step
in the expansion of discovery for both the pros-
ecution and the defense. Given the initial advan-
tage of the government in obtaining evidence
for trial, a nearly equal increase in disclosure
for both sides leaves the parties in the same rel-
ative imbalance as prior to the amended rules.
This imbalance infringes upon the defendant's
due process rights, while specific sections of the
amended rules, especially the exclusion sanction,
may affront other constitutional guarantees.
Because of the number of unresolved consti-
tutional and semantic issues regarding the
amended rules, Congress was wise to postpone
their effective date until August 1, 1975. Al-
though it would be naive to expect that all the
possible constitutional problems will be explored
and corrected, the rules which finally become
law should contain significant revisions from
the amendments as originally transmitted to
Congress.
(may be a denial of due process to refuse the de-
fendant discovery of his statements to the police) ;
Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967)(denial of
due process when law enforcement agencies know-
ingly present or let stand uncontradicted false evi-
dence or withhold material exculpatory evidence) ;
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957)
(may be a denial of due process to withhold from
the defendant an informant's identity or the con-
tents of his communications); Nakell, Discovery,
supra note 4, at 452.
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JOINDER OF SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSES AND PERJURY
IN ONE INDICTMENT
Investigation of criminal offenses is one of
the primary functions of a federal grand jury,'
and its powers incident to that function are
broad indeed.2 One such power is the unques-
tioned right to call as witnesses persons who
are "targets" of particular investigations.3 Al-
though any witness before the grand jury is
entitled to invoke his fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination, 4 the "target"
'See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 343-44 (1974); United States v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglass Company, 271 F. Supp. 561,
565 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
2 United States v. Brozovich, 465 F.2d 372 (9th
Cir. 1972). For cases involving the power to sub-
poena documents see In re Corrado Brothers, 367
F. Supp. 1126 (D.C. Del. 1973); In re Grand
fury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 342 F. Supp. 709
(D.C. Md. 1972). For cases involving the power
to subpoena witnesses see United States v. Calan-
dra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974); Nixon v. Sirica,
487 F.2d 700, 712 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
The grand jury has no power to enforce its own
subpoenas, however. It must resort to the courts
for enforcement. Brown v. United States, 359 U.S.
41, 49 (1959). Federal courts will not enforce
grand jury subpoenas if the grand jury is not
pursuing an investigation in good faith or is moti-
vated by a desire to harrass an individual. It. re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 7.2d 85, 91 (3d Cir.
1973).
3 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 10 n.8
(1973) ; United States v. Sweig, 441 F.2d 114, 121(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971);
United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204, 206-08(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965).
4 See Comment, The Grand Jury Witness' Priv-
ilege Against Self-Incrimination, 62 Nw. U.L.
REv. 207, 216-25 (1967). See also United States
v. Kastigar, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972).
The grand jury may override a fifth amendment
claim only if the witness is granted immunity co-
extensive with the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974).
There is some question as to the right of such a
witness to Miranda-type warnings prior to his tes-
timony. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit has held that a witness who is a target of a
grand jury investigation is entitled to such warn-
ings. United States v. Luxenberg, 374 F.2d 241
(6th Cir. 1967). One commentator suggests that,
although the law is unclear, it has been the gen-
eral practice in federal grand jury proceedings to
give Miranda-type warnings to "target" witnesses.
Beigal, The Investigation and Prosecution of Po-
lice Corruption, 65 J. CRIm. L. & C. 135, 145 n.38
(1974). In any event, there is no duty to give
witness may choose to waive its protection in
an attempt to exculpate himself.
Should the grand jury conclude that it has
probable cause to indict the "target" witness
for the substantive offense under investigation,
this exculpatory testimony may provide the
basis for an additional charge of perjury.5 If
the grand jury decides to indict the "target"
witness for perjury as well as the substantive
offense under investigation, these offenses can
be, and often are, joined for trial in one
indictment" pursuant to rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.7
such warnings to "ordinary" witnesses. Robinson
v. United States, 401 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1968);
United States v. DiMichele, 375 F.2d 959 (3d Cir.
1967).
5 18 U.S.C. § 1621 and 18 U.S.C. § 1623 provide
that perjury before a federal grand jury is punish-
able as a felony. For an excellent discussion of
perjury in general see Comment, Perjury-Tbe
Forgotten Offense, 65 J. CPam. L. & C. 361
(1974).
6United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th
Cir. 1974); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d
1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) ;
United States v. Pacente, 490 F.2d 661 (7th Cir.
1973), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing en
banc, 503 F.2d 543 (7th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Gill, 490 F.2d 233 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974); United States v. Carson,
464 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949
(1972) ; United States v. Sweig, 441 F.2d 114 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1970) ; United
States v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); United States v. Isaacs, 347 F. Supp. 743
(N.D. Ill. 1972); United States v. Sweig, 316 F.
Supp. 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ; United States v.
Wolfson, 282 F. Supp. 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
United States v. Cohen, 230 F. Supp. 587
(S.D.N.Y.), mandamus denied, 332 F.2d 975 (2d
Cir. 1964); United States v. Haim, 218 F. Supp.
922 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) ; United States v. Verra, 203
F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
7 FED. R. CRImi. P. 8.
(a) Joinder of Offenses. Two or more off en-
ses may be charged in the same indictment or
information in a separate count for each of-
fense if the offenses charged, whether felonies
or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or
similar character or are based on the same act
or transaction or on two or more acts or
transactions connected together or constituting
parts of a common scheme or plan.
(b) Joinder of Defendants. Two or more de-
fendants may be charged in the same indict-
Vol. 66, No. 1
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JOINDER
It is the position of this comment that join-
der in one indictment of substantive offenses
and perjury before the grand jury which in-
vestigated those offenses is prejudicial to the
defendant. This comment will explore some of
the ramifications of, and objections to, this
type of joinder in light of rules 8 and 14 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.8
Separate consideration will be given to cases
involving single and multiple defendants, as
the problems involved in each are somewhat
different.
Although it is not the purpose of this com-
ment to present an extensive discussion of
rules 8 and 14, a brief overview of those rules
will contribute to a better understanding of the
subject matter.
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure is applicable to cases involving only
one defendant. 9 It permits (but does not re-
quire) two or more offenses to be joined in
one indictment for purposes of trial.'0 Under
the rule, offenses may be joined if they are
"of the same or similar character" ;1 if they
ment or information if they are alleged to
have participated in the same act or transac-
tion or in the same series of acts or transac-
tions constituting an offense or offenses. Such
defendants may be charged in one or more
counts together or separately and all of the
defendants need not be charged in each count.8 FED. R. CmM. P. 14.
Relief From Prejudicial Joinder. If it appears
that a defendant or the government is preju-
diced by a joinder of offenses or defendants in
an indictment or information or by such join-
der for trial together, the court may order an
election or separate trial of counts, grant a
severance of defendants, or provide whatever
other relief justice requires....
9 1 ORFIELD, CIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES, § 8.47, at 801 (1966).
Joinder of offenses committed by tvo or more
defendants is controlled by rule 8(b). 8 J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACrICE, § 8.05(1), at 8-17 (Cipes ed.
1965). Cf. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124,
1158 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974) :
"When multiple defendants are charged in the
same as well as multiple counts, a challenge by a
single defendant to joinder of offenses in which he
is charged is governed by Rule 8(a)."
10 See note 7 supra.
11Joinder of offenses "of the same or similar
character" is permissible only against a single de-
fendant. 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 8.06(1),
at 8-24 (Cipes ed. 1965).
Similar-offense joinder under Rule 8(a) is criti-
cized in 1 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE, § 143, at 316-17 (1969) and 8 J. MooRE,
are based on "the same act or transaction";:12
or if they are based on "two or more acts or
transactions connected together or constituting
parts of a common scheme or plan." .3
Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure is applicable to multi-defendant
cases, and permits two or more defendants to
be joined in one indictment for purposes of
trial.' 4 Under rule 8(b), defendants may be
joined "if they are alleged' 5 to have partici-
FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 8.05(2), at 8-19 (Cipes ed.
1965).
For a discussion of the evidentiary problems in-
volved in similar offense joinder see Bradley v.
United States, 433 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir.
1964) ; Comment, Joint and Single Trials Under
Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rides of Criminal
Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 553, 556-60 (1965).
12 It is the policy of the Justice Department
"that several offenses arising out of a single trans-
action should be alleged and tried together and
should not be made the basis of multiple prosecu-
tions, a policy dictated by considerations both of
fairness to defendants and of efficient and orderly
law enforcement." Petite v. United States, 361
U.S. 529, 530 (1960).13 In determining whether offenses are based on
"acts or transactions connected together", the pre-
dominant consideration is whether joinder would
serve the goals of trial economy and convenience.
This consideration is reflected in concrete form in
the following test: whether evidence sufficient to
establish the defendant's guilt of one offense will
also serve to establish his guilt of another offense.
United States v. Pacente, 490 F.2d 661 (7th Cir.
1973), reV'd on other grounds on rehearing en
banc, 503 F.2d 543 (7th Cir. 1974) ; United States
v. Sweig, 441 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 932 (1970). The primary purpose of this
ind of joinder is to insure that a given transac-
tion need only be proved once. Baker v. United
States, 401 F.2d 958, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
14 See note 7 supra.
15 Since it is solely the allegation which initially
supports joinder of defendants, the issue of "retro-
active misjoinder" arises if it is later determined
that the allegation is baseless. This situation arises
most often in cases where an allegation of conspir-
acy constitutes the connecting link between other-
wise unrelated offenses and defendants. Four ex-
amples are identifiable: 1) the trial court, prior to
submission of the case to the jury, dismisses the
conspiracy count for failure of proof, and contin-
ues to try the defendants jointly on the unrelated
substantive offenses. Dismissal of the conspiracy
count does not result in misjoinder, since the orig-
inal allegations of the indictment met the explicit
provisions of rule 8(b). Schaeffer v. United
States, 362 U.S. 511 (1960). But see United
States v. Branker, 395 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1029 (1969); 2) an appel-
late court, rather than the trial court, decides that
the conspiracy count was not proved at trial and
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pated in the same act or transaction or in the
same series of acts or transactions constituting
an offense or offenses."16
Courts broadly construe rule 8 in favor of
initial joinder of offenses'1 or defendants' in
order to effectuate its goal of "the economy of
a single trial." " This is especially true in sin-
gle defendant cases where the offenses sought
to be joined under rule 8(a) are based on the
same act or transaction, or arise out of a series
of factually connected acts.2 0 There is no limit
reverses conspiracy convictions, but affirms convic-
tions on the substantive counts. There is no issue
of misjoinder when the initial joinder was proper
under rule 8(b). Fernandez v. United States, 329
F.2d 899, 905-06 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 832 (1964) ; 3) the jury acquits all defend-
ants on the conspiracy count, but convicts on the
substantive counts. "[W]here there is evidence
from which a jury may find a connection, joint ac-
tivity and conspiracy, the failure of the jury to
convict in such fashion will not retroactively es-
tablish misjoinder." Cacy v. United States, 298
F.2d 227, 228-29 (9th Cir. 1961) ; 4) the conspir-
acy count is dismissed, and there is either a
mistrial or a reversal on appeal of the convictions
on substantive counts. On retrial of the substantive
counts, the defendants may be tried jointly. United
States v. Granello, 365 F.2d 990, 994-95 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1019 (1967).
The good faith of the government in joining de-
fendants under rule 8(b) is an issue to be consid-
ered in situations such as that above described.
E.g., United States v. Donaway, 447 F.2d 940, 943
(9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Manfredi, 275
F.2d 588, 593 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 828
(1960).
'
6 Unlike rule 8(a), rule 8(b) makes no pro-
vision of joinder of offenses of the same or similar
character. 1 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
cEDURE, § 144, at 319 (1969) ; see also United
States v. Williamson, 310 F.2d 192, 197 n.16 (9th
Cir. 1962).
17 E.g., United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124,
1158 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) ;
United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1082(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1972).
s E.g., United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879,
899 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1970) ;
United States v. Isaacs, 347 F. Supp. 743, 761(N.D. Ill. 1972).
19 Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 88 (D.C.
Cir. 1964).
20 When joined offenses arise from the same act
or transaction, or from a series of connected acts,
the proof necessary to establish the defendant's
guilt of one offense is generally sufficient to estab-
lish his guilt of the other. Under these circum-
stances, trial convenience dictates that the govern-
ment should not be made to prove the same facts
twice. Tillman v. United States, 406 F.2d 930, 934(5th Cir.), vacated in part on other grounds, 395
U.S. 830 (1969).
This consideration of trial economy does not
to the number of offenses which may be joined
in one indictment pursuant to rule 8(a) ;21 nor
does rule 8(b) limit the number of defendants
who may be joined for trial. 22
Misjoinder of offenses, without more, does
not require reversal of a conviction. 23 The cir-
cumstances of a particular case may indicate to
an appellate court that the misjoinder was
harmless to the defendant; in that event, rule
52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 24 (the harmless error rule) applies.
If misjoinder of offenses is found to constitute
error outside of the scope of rule 52, the ap-
propriate relief is election or separate trial of
offenses, not dismissal of the indictment.25
The harmless error rule 26 is applicable to
apply, however, in the case of similar-offense join-
der. Because these offenses are unrelated, i.e., are
not based "on the same act or transaction or on
two or more acts or transactions connected to-
gether," the evidence necessary to prove the de-
fendant's guilt of one offense will not suffice to es-
tablish his guilt of the other. 8 J. MooRa, FEmRL
PACTIC, § 8.05(2), at 8-19 (Cipes ed. 1965).
238 3. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE, § 8.05(1), at
8-17 (Cipes ed. 1965).
Joinder of offenses not only results in trial
economies, but also increases the government's
chances of conviction on at least some counts.
"Separate criminal acts in a single transaction
may be split up into as many counts relating to
the transaction as the United States Attorney may
think necessary, so that if the facts as proved turn
out to be insufficient for conviction on one count
the Government may have the benefit of them on
another charge to which they are applicable. . ....
Orth v. United States, 252 F. 566 (4th Cir. 1919).
22 Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249, 264(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836 (1963).
For a discussion of the problems involved in
mass-joinder of defendants see United States v.
Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 840-41 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 372 U.S. 959 (1962); United States v. Bu-
falino, 285 F.2d 408, 417-18 (2d Cir. 1960) ; Note,
Joinder of Defendants in Criminal Prosecutions,
42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 513, 531-35 (1967).
23 Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 973-74
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965(1970).2 4 FED. R. CRIm. P. 52.
(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irreg-
ularity, or variance which does not affect sub-
stantial rights shall be disregarded.
Rule 52 is applicable to misjoinder of offenses.
Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 973-74(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965(1970).
25 United States v. Goodman, 285 F2d 378, 379
(5th Cir. 1960) ; United States v. Bally Manufac-
turing Corp., 345 F. Supp. 410, 429 (E.D. La.
1972).
26 See note 24 supra.
[Vol. 66
JOINDER
misjoinder of defendants under rule 8(b), 27
with one exception: where multiple defendants
are charged with unrelated offenses, and are
tried together, prejudice is presumed and the
trial court has no discretion to deny relief. 28 If
misjoinder of defendants is found to constitute
error beyond the scope of the harmless error
rule, the appropriate relief is severance of de-
fendants, not dismissal of the indictment.
29
Although a particular joinder of offenses or
defendants may satisfy the literal requirements
of rule 8, the effect of that joinder may be so
prejudicial to a defendant that relief may be
sought under rule 14 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.30 However, it has often
been held that an election or severance of of-
fenses is not mandated by rule 14, despite the
fact that a particular joinder of offenses may
be prejudicial to the defendant. Similarly, trial
courts rarely grant severances of defendants
under rule 14.31 In order to promote the goal
of trial efficiency embodied in rule 8, trial and
appellate courts consistently resort to other
means to cure the prejudice engendered by
joinder.3 2
27 E.g., United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879,
901 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1970) ;
United States v. Granello, 365 F.2d 990, 995 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert denied, 386 U.S. 1019 (1967).2 8 E.g., Metheany v. United States, 365 F.2d 90,
94-95 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Spector,
326 F.2d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 1963).
"Such a rule is justified since the introduction at
the trial of one defendant of evidence which in law
is relevant only to the guilt of another in itself is
prejudicial, and it would be inappropriate to specu-
late as to the extent to which that evidence may
have affected the deliberations of the jury or em-
barrassed the defendant in presenting his defense."
Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 973-74 &
n.63 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965(1970).29 1 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE, § 145, at 337 (1969).
30 See note 8 supra, and discussion of rule 14
infra. See Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85
(D.C. Cir. 1964), for some of the reasons why a
defendant may be prejudiced by joint trial of of-
fenses; see notes 46-49 and 90--108 infra and ac-
companying text for some of the reasons why one
or more defendants may be prejudiced by joinder
of defendants.
31 Davenport v. United States, 260 F.2d 591, 594
(9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 909
(1959) ; Comment, Joint and Single Trials Under
Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 553, 554 & n:4 (1965).
32For cases involving joinder of offenses see
United States v. Williamson, 482 F.2d 508, 511-12
(5th Cir. 1973) (instructions to the jury that evi-
Relief from joinder of offenses or defendants
which is otherwise proper under rule 8 may
be sought by motion pursuant to rule 14.3 3
Whether offenses or defendants should be tried
jointly or separately is a matter within the dis-
cretion of the trial court,34 and relief from
joinder will be granted only upon an affirma-
tive showing that a fair trial cannot be ob-
tained without severance.35 The trial court's
determination that joinder is or is not prejudi-
cial is virtually unreviewable, in that an appel-
late court will intervene only upon finding
clear abuse of discretion."0
In determining whether the trial court has
abused its discretion in denying severance of
offenses, appellate courts have relied upon the
following tests, among others: the likelihood
that the jury became confused in its delibera-
tions and applied evidence directed to one of-
dence presented on each count is to be considered
separately in determining guilt negates any preju-
dice which may have resulted from joinder);
United States v. Hatcher, 423 F2d 1086, 1089
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970)
(jury verdict of acquittal on one count indicates
that no prejudice resulted from joinder) ; Baker v.
United States, 401 F.2d 958, 973-74 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970) ("the
concurrent sentences imposed by the District Court
make unnecessary any inquiry by us into the pos-
sibility of such prejudice"). For cases involving
joinder of defendants see notes 46, 48 and 49 infra
and accompanying text.
338 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 14.02(1), at
14-2 (Cipes ed. 1965) ; cf. United States v. Gougis,
374 F.2d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 1967).
See Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) for a discussion of the principal reasons
vhy a defendant may be prejudiced by joinder of
offenses; see notes 46-49 and 90-108 infra and
accompanying text for some of the reasons why
one or more defendants may be prejudiced byjoinder of defendants.3 4 E.g., Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 95
(1954) ; United States v. Johnson, 478 F.2d 1129,
1131 (5th Cir. 1973) ; Frieje v. United States, 408
F.2d 100 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 396 U.S. 859
(1969) (the trial court's discretion is particularly
broad in a bench trial).35 E.g., United States v. Perez, 489 F2d 51, 65
(5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Blue, 440 F2d
300, 302 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 836
(1971).
A general, unsupported assertion of prejudice is
not enough to justify the severance of counts
properly joined. Williamson v. United States, 310
F.2d 192, 197 (9th Cir. 1962).
36 See note 34 supra. Refusal to grant a sever-
ance has been upheld even when the circumstances
indicated that a severance would have been justifi-




fense to another offense; whether a weak evi-
'dentiary case and a strong one were joined in
the hope that an over-lapping consideration of
the evidence would lead to convictions on
both; whether the sentences on two or more
convictions are to run concurrently; and
whether evidence admissible on one count
would also have been admissible in a separate
trial of the other count.37
Application of these tests, however, rarely
leads to the conclusion that severance of offen-
ses should have been granted. For example, ap-
pellate courts have held that when the evidence
is simple and readily referable to the crime
with respect to which it was introduced, sever-
ance of offenses is not required by fear that
the jury will consider evidence directed to one
count in its deliberations on another.38 It has
also been held that severance of offenses is not
required merely because proof under one count
may be stronger than proof under another.39
The fact that conviction on two or more counts
is followed by imposition of concurrent sen-
tences is said to obviate any possibility that
joinder of offenses was prejudicial to the
defendant.4 0 Finally, it has been held that, de-
spite the prejudicial effects of joinder of offen-
ses, separate trial of offenses offers no relief to
a defendant when evidence of one crime would
37 See United States v. Williamson, 482 F2d
508, 511 (5th Cir. 1973); Robinson v. United
States, 459 F2d 847, 855-56 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
United States v. Clayton, 450 F.2d 16, 18-19 (1st
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 975 (1972).38 Dunaway v. United States, 205 F.2d 23,
26-27 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
Instructions to the jury that evidence of each
offense is to be considered independently of evi-
dence pertaining to other offenses further reduces
the possibility of prejudice. United States v. Clay-
ton, 450 F.2d 16, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. de-
nied, 405 U.S. 975 (1972); United States v.
Adams, 434 F2d 756, 759 (2d Cir. 1970).
. 39 United States v. Sherman, 84 F. Supp. 130,
131-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1947), rezld in part on other
grounds, 171 F.2d 619 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337
U.S. 931 (1948) ; accord, United States v. Rogers,
475 F.2d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 1973). But cf. Gregory
v. United States, 396 F.2d 185, 189 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
40E.g., United States v. Clayton, 450 F.2d 16,
18-19 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 975(1972); Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965(1970). It has also been held that refusal to grant
a severance of offenses is not prejudicial where
the jury acquits as to one count. Gornick v.
United States, 320 F.2d 325, 326 (10th Cir. 1963).
be admissible in a separate trial of another
crime.4
1
In multi-defendant cases, the showing
needed for severance of defendants or separate
trial of counts is greater than in the case of a
single defendant charged with multiple
counts.4 Courts generally hold that persons in-
dicted together should be tried together,4 ab-
sent compelling circumstances. 4 This judicial
attitude emanates from the nature of the for-
mal requisites of rule 8(b), and is typically
justified on grounds of public convenience.45
The tests employed to determine whether
joinder of defendants is, so prejudicial as to
justify relief under rule 14 are similar to
those employed when the prejudicial effect of
joinder of offenses is at issue. As with joinder
of offenses, application of these tests rarely
leads to the conclusion that a denial of sever-
ance was an abuse of discretion. For example,
appellate courts uniformly reject arguments
that the jury became confused and applied evi-
dence introduced against one defendant in its
determination of the guilt of another. Instead,
appellate courts rely upon the trial court's cau-
4"United States v. Williamson, 482 F2d 508,
511 (5th Cir. 1973); Robinson v. United States,
459 F.2d 847, 855-56 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
42 United States v. Rogers, 475 F.2d 821, 828(7th Cir. 1973).
43 E.g., United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51, 65(5th Cir. 1973); Brown v. United States, 375
F.2d 310, 315 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S.
915 (1967). "Such a rule conserves judicial re-
sources, alleviates the burdens on citizens serving
as jurors, and avoids the necessity of having wit-
nesses reiterate testimony in a series of trials."
United States v. Borelli, 435 F.2d 500, 502 (2d
Cir. 1970).
44 United States v. DeSapio, 435 F2d 272, 280(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 999 (1971).
"The defendant must show something more than
the fact that a separate trial might offer him a
better chance of acquittal." Tillman v. United
States, 406 F.2d 930, 935 (5th Cir.),-vacated in
part on other grounds, 395 U.S. 830 (1969).
See 1 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE AND PROCE-
DURE, § 223, at 443 & nn.38-45 (1969) and Note,
Joinder of Defendants in Criminal Prosecutions,
42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 513, 530 & nn.125-30 (1967)
for examples of what does not constitute compel-
ling circumstances.
5See notes 20 and 42 supra. See Daly v.
United States, 231 F.2d 123, 125 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 964 (1956). But see United
States v. Claytor, 52 F.R.D. 360, 363 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), where the court placed primary emphasis
on the defendants' need for protection against pre-judicial joinder.
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tionary instructions to the jury.46 It has also
been held that severance of defendants is not
required merely because the evidence against
one defendant is stronger than that against a
co-defendant.47 Appellate courts have relied
upon the jury's verdict with respect to co-de-
fendants when confronted with a defendant's
claim that he was prejudiced by a joint trial.48
Finally, although joinder pursuant to rule
8(b) may be prejudicial to one or more de-
fendants, severance is held to offer no relief
when evidence admissible on one count or
against one defendant would also be admissible
in a separate trial of other counts or
defendants. 49
In light of the foregoing judicial interpreta-
tion of rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, this comment will discuss
joinder in one indictment of substantive offen-
ses and perjury before the grand jury which
investigated those substantive offenses and the
manner in which a defendant may be preju-
diced by such joinder.
INDICTMENT CHARGES A SINGLE DEFENDANT
wrrH ONE OR MORE SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSES
AND PERJURY BEFoRE THE GRND JuRY
WHICH INVESTIGATED THOSE SUBSTANTIVE
OFFENSES
As discussed above, a federal grand jury, in
its investigation of criminal offenses, is enti-
tled to call before it any person suspected of
committing those offenses, and it may question
such a witness concerning his knowledge of, or
participation in, the criminal activity under
investigation. 0 Upon the grand jury's decision
to indict the "target" witness for the substan-
tive offense under investigation, a denial of
any knowledge of, or participation in, that of-
46 See, e.g., United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d
128, 138 (7th Cir. 1972); Peterson v. United
States, 344 F.2d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 1965). See also
United States v. Branker, 395 F.2d 881, 887-89
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1029 (1969).
But see United States v. Bruton, 391 U.S. 123
(1967).
47 United States v. Heinlein, 490 F2d 725, 737
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
48 See, e.g., United States v. Baum, 482 F.2d
1325, 1332 (2d Cir. 1973) ; United States v. Hutul,
416 F.2d 607, 620 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1012 (1970).49 United States v. Rogers, 475 F2d 821, 828 &
cases cited therein (7th Cir. 1973).50 See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
fense can, and often does, provide the basis for
a charge of perjury as well. 51
It seems clear that when the perjury charge
emanates from the defendant's testimony on
the subject-matter of the grand jury's investi-
gation, both charges can be joined in one in-
dictment for purposes of trial. Support for
such joinder is found in the language of rule
8(a). Because one or more elements of the
substantive offense form the subject-matter of
the perjury count, the two offenses constitute
. . two or more acts or transactions con-
nected together . . ." 52 within the meaning of
rule 8(a). Further justification for joinder in
this situation is found in the fact that evidence
necessary to prove the substantive count will
also suffice to establish guilt under the perjury
count.
5 3
One commentator 54 suggests that inclusion
in an indictment of a charge of perjury before
the grand jury is advantageous to the prosecu-
tion for several reasons. Among these are: the
increased possibility in a close case of a com-
promise verdict;55 the likelihood that the pres-
ence of the perjury count in the indictment
will indicate to the petit jurors that the grand
jurors-laymen like themselves-believed the
defendant was not a truthful witness; the like-
lihood that the presence of the perjury count
in the indictment will force the defendant to
testify at trial;56 and the opportunity to punish
51 E.g., United States v. Pacente, 490 F2d 661
(7th Cir. 1973), re7/d on other grounds on rehear-
ing en banc, 503 F.2d 543 (7th Cir. 1974) ; United
States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972); United States v.
Sweig, 441 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 932 (1971).
52 United States v. Pacente, 490 F.2d 661, 663
(7th Cir. 1973), rez/d on other grounds on rehear-
ing en bane, 503 F2d 543 (7th Cir. 1974).
53Id.; United States v. Sweig, 441 F.2d 114,
118-19 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932
(1971).
5 Beigal, The Investigation and Prosecution of
Police Corruption, 65 J. Cpam. L. & C. 135
(1974).
55 Beigal notes the importance of joinder where,
without the perjury count, the indictment would
have only one count. Beigal, The Investigation and
Prosecution of Police Corruption, 65 J. CalM. L.
& C. 135, 143 (1974).
56 Beigal hypothesizes that, because the defend-
ant's grand -jury testimony will be introduced at
the trial, the defendant cannot afford to remain si-
lent at trial. Id.
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a person for substantive offenses rendered
moot by the statute of limitations.57
While joinder in one indictment of substan-
tive offenses and perjury may indeed be ad-
vantageous to the prosecution, it is clear that
rule 8 was not designed to circumvent long
established policies in the administration of
criminal justice. It is not the function of a
prosecutor to join offenses in an indictment
for the purpose of achieving compromise ver-
dicts. Articulation of such an advantage indi-
cates a probability that the substantive offense
or offenses, absent a charge of perjury and ev-
idence supporting that charge, might not be
supported by evidence sufficient to justify a
conviction. A joinder designed to overcome
this probability is beyond the role of the prose-
cutor in our system of criminal justice, as in-
dicated by standard 3.9(a) of the American
Bar Association Standards Relating to the
Prosecution Function and the Defense Func-
tion,58 which states: "It is unprofessional con-
duct for a prosecutor to institute or cause to be
instituted criminal charges when he knows that
the charges are not supported by probable
cause." The suggested revision of standard
3.9(a) reads as follows: "It is unprofessional
conduct for the prosecutor to prosecute charges
for which there is insufficient supporting legal
evidence." 59
Nor is it within the scope of the prosecu-
torial function to include a charge of perjury
before the grand jury in an indictment for the
purpose of demonstrating to the petit jurors
5 An equally important use of the federal
false testimony statutes is the permissability of
indicting an officer for collecting money more
than five years prior to the date of the indict-
ment. These payments would be beyond indict-
ment under the Hobbs Act because of the
statute of limitations. A prosecutor with wit-
nesses who have paid money to a police
officer, for example in 1964, may call the
officer before the grand jury and ask him if
he ever asked for or received any money from
any businessman in the course of his official
duties. If the officer testifies that he did not,
he can be prosecuted under the perjury or
false declaration statute despite the fact that,
had he answered in the affirmative, he could
not have been indicted at all.
Id. at 143.
58 See Uvillar, The Virtuous Prosecutor in
Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance from
the ABA, 71 MicH. L.R. 1143, 1148 (1973).
59 Id. at 1154.
that the defendant's trial testimony is not trust-
worthy. Inclusion of the perjury charge in an
indictment for such a purpose may be, in es-
sence, an attempt by the prosecutor to trans-
form the perjury count from an accusation of
guilt into evidence on the substantive count.
Because a defendant in a criminal trial is pre-
sumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, an indictment is not, and
cannot be, evidence of the guilt of the
accused. 60
Nor is it the function of a prosecutor to de-
vise methods to force a criminal defendant to
waive his fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. The United States Supreme
Court, in Malloy v. Hogan,6' stated clearly and
unmistakably that a defendant's fifth amend-
ment privilege is the "essential mainstay" of
our criminal justice system.62
Finally, it is not the function of a prosecutor
to include a perjury count in an indictment for
the purpose of punishing a defendant for sub-
stantive offenses not indictable because the
statute of limitations has run. Although a
perjury charge can be based on false testimony
given before a federal grand jury, it is also
true that a prosecutor who directs a grand
jury to investigate crimes for which it cannot
return true bills because the statute of limita-
tions has run, has no purpose other than ex-
traction of perjured testimony from the de-
fendant. Case law indicates that such a purpose
voids the perjury charge ab initi0.3
Setting aside the issue of the prosecutor's
function vis-a-vis joinder, it is evident that the
propriety of the joinder under rule 8(a) does
not foreclose a defendant's claim that joinder
in one indictment of substantive offenses and
perjury may prejudice him.
60 Garrison v. United States, 353 F2d 94, 96
(10th Cir. 1965).
61378 U.S. 1 (1964).
62 Id. at 7.
63 Brown v. United States, 245 F.2d 549 (8th
Cir. 1957) ; United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp.
383 (D.D.C. 1956); cf. United States v. Mandu-jano, 496 F.2d 1050, 1058 (5th Cir. 1974) and
United States v. Rangel, 496 F.2d 1059, 1063 (5th
Cir. 1974) (failure to give the target-witness Mi-
randa-type warnings prior to his grand jury testi-
mony makes that testimony inadmissable in a sub-
sequent perjury prosecuqion). Contra, United




A defendant's claim that joinder of a sub-
stantive offense and a charge of perjury was
so prejudicial as to require an election or sev-
erance of counts under rule 14 was upheld by
a panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Pacente.64 In Pacente the defendant was in-
dicted in one count for extortion in violation of
the Hobbs Act 65 and in another count for per-
jury before a special grand jury investigating
possible Hobbs Act violations. He was con-
victed on both counts, and sentenced to
concurrent terms of three years on each count.
In reversing the convictions because the trial
court had failed to sever the counts, the panel
distinguished a multi-count indictment charg-
ing various substantive offenses only from a
multi-count indictment charging perjury as
well as substantive offenses. The presence of
the perjury count was found prejudicial to the
defendant's ability to defend on the substantive
count, because
[i]n the event the defendant testifies concern-
ing the substantive charge, the knowledge of
the false declaration count has the effect of in-
forming the petit jurors that the defendant's
testimony is not to be believed. Accordingly,
the defendant is impeached as soon as he
reaches the witness stand. On the other hand,
in the event that defendant chooses not to take
the stand the substantive offense is substan-
tially reinforced by the addition of the false
declaration count.66
Unlike so many other courts,67 the panel in
Pacente rejected the notion that the prejudice
engendered by this joinder of offenses could be
cured by limiting instructions to the jury.68
64 490 F2d 661 (7th Cir. 1973).
65 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970).66 United States v. Pacente, 490 F2d 661, 664
(7th Cir. 1973), rev'd on rehearing en banc, 503
F2d 543, 547 (7th Cir. 1974). Cf. United States v.
Carson, 464 F2d 424, 436 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 949 (1972) (the commonality of proof
betveen the perjury count and other counts in the
indictment permits denial of a rule 14 motion to
sever offenses).
67 See note 32 siupra.
08United States v. Pacente, 490 F.2d 661,
665-66 (7th Cir. 1973), re'd on rehearing en
banc, 503 F.2d 543, 547-48 (7th Cir. 1974).
There is a subtle difference between "limiting
instructions" and "curative instructions :"
The curative instruction functions as an alter-
native to the granting of a new trial whenever
The panel opinion, however, was reversed by
an en banc court69 which specifically rejected
the panel's denial of the efficacy of the limiting
instructions to the jury as a means of curing
prejudice.
The relevant limiting instructions given by
the trial court to the jury in Pacente are:
You are instructed to consider the testimony
given by the defendant Pacente before the
Grand Jury . . .only as evidence under count
2 of the indictment and you should not con-
sider it as evidence on any other count in the
indictment .... 70
With respect to these instructions, the panel in
Pacente noted that a "vital question is whether
a limiting instruction such as the one here in
the context of this case can erase the slate
once it is written upon." 71 The panel ruled
that these limiting instructions would not suf-
fice to dissuade the jurors from considering
the grand jury's determination that the defend-
ant had lied when he denied any participation
in Hobbs Act violations in their deliberations
on the substantive count. To so ignore the
grand jury's determination, said the panel,
"would require twelve minds more perfectly
disciplined than those of the average human
jurors." 72 The en banc court dismissed the
fears of the panel as unwarranted specula-
tion, 7 3 noting that "[o]ur theory of trial relies
inadmissible evidence is heard by the jury. It
is presumed that, as a result of the judge's
admonition, the jury will completely disregard
the incompetent evidence. The limiting instruc-
tion functions somewhat differently in that the
jury bears and considers evidence, but is
charged to limit consideration of it to its com-
petent use. The function required of the jury
in implementing the limiting instruction is
probably more difficult. Rather than entirely
disregarding the evidence, the juror must ulti-
mately consider it but only for a limited pur-
pose.
Note, The Limiting Instruction--Its Effectiveness
and Effect, 51 Mrixy. L. R v. 264, 267 (1966).
69 United States v. Pacente, 503 F.2d 543 (7th
Cir. 1974).
70 Id. at 547.
71490 F2d 661, 665 (7th Cir. 1973) (emphasis
added).
72 United States v. Pacente, 490 F2d 661, 666
(7th Cir. 1973), ree'd on rehearing en; banc, 503
F.2d 543, 548 (7th Cir. 1974).




upon the ability of a jury to follow instruc-
tions." 74
This difference of opinion concerning the
ability of jurors to follow limiting instructions
designed to eliminate the possibility of preju-
dice appears to be the crux of the conflict be-
tween the panel and the en bane court. Neither
position can be characterized as absolutely cor-
rect, given the traditional secrecy surrounding
a jury's decision-making process. What little
empirical evidence exists on the subject of the
efficacy of limiting instructions to the jury,
however, supports the position of the panel.75
This empirical evidence indicates not only that
jurors often do not remember the trial court's
instructions sufficiently to attempt to follow
them, but also, and more importantly, that lim-
iting instructions sensitize jurors to the very
evidence they are directed to ignore.78 This po-
sition is complimentary to the experience of
many respected jurists who view the limiting
instruction as incapable of accomplishing its
purpose. 7
Further support for the panel's rejection of
the notion that the limiting instructions could
effectively compartmentalize the grand jury's
determination in the minds of the petit jurors
is found in the superficial nature of the in-
structions themselves. The instructions given
by the trial court delineate no reasons why the
petit jurors should ignore the grand jury's de-
termination that the defendant lied in their
consideration of the substantive count. Com-
mon sense teaches that seemingly arbitrary
directions to act in a certain manner are more
easily accepted and followed when the reasons
behind that direction are explained.
The respective positions of the en bane court
and the panel regarding the value of limiting
74 Id.75 See Note, The Limiting Instruction--Its
Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN. L. REV. 264,
265-66 & nn.7-16 (1966).
76 1d.
77 See Delli Raoli v. United States, 352 U.S.
232, 247-48 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 623
(1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454 (1949) (Jackson,
J., concurring); Delli Raoli v. United States, 229
F.2d 319, 321, 323 (2d Cir. 1956) (L. Hand, J.)
(Frank, J., dissenting) ; Nash v. United States, 54
F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, J.); People
v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P2d 265 (1965)
(Traynor, C.J.).
instructions ultimately reduce themselves to
value judgments on the abilities of individual
jurors. The en banc court appears to have
placed the juror on a pedestal, perceiving in
him extraordinary power to control his own
emotions. The panel opinion, on the other
hand, recognizes that jurors are unversed in
the ways of the law.7 8
Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure was designed to avoid prejudice be-
fore the fact by segmenting trials.79 The panel
in Pacente appears to have implemented that
design, not only by rejecting commonly used,
after the fact, curative devices,80 but also by its
analysis of the uniqueness of the joinder.8'
Furthermore, the reasoning and result of the
panel opinion are more consistent with a real-
istic view of a juror's limitations. The panel
permits a defendant to rely upon the presump-
tion of innocence traditionally accorded crimi-
nal defendants, the right to trial by jury, and
the obligation of the government to prove him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
INDICTMENT CHARGES MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS
VARIOUSLY WITH SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSES AND
PERJURY BEFORE THE GRAND JURY WHICH
INVESTIGATED THOSE SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSES
Joinder in one indictment of multiple de-
fendants, variously charged with substantive
offenses and perjury before the grand jury,
78 In assessing the fallibility of petit jurors, the
Seventh Circuit has acknowledged that information
which may seem "innocuous" to the government or
the court has actually and demonstrably not ap-
peared so to the jurors. United States v. Thomas,
463 F2d 1061, 1065 (7th Cir. 1972).
79See Note, Joint and Single Trials Under
Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 553, 556 (1965).
80 But see United States v. Pacente, 503 F2d
543, 547-48 (7th Cir. 1974).
81 However, the panel's reliance on the unique
aspects of this joinder may also be the weakest
feature of the opinion, in terms of the function to
be served by rule 14. The panel has provided a
guide for the application of Rule 14 in a limited
factual setting only, and has thereby facilitated fu-
ture efforts to distinguish its reasoning.
Perhaps the pane's failure to provide general
guidelines for the application of rule 14 in all
cases can be explained by the fact that federal
courts deal with claims of prejudicial joinder only
on a case by case basis. See, e.g., United States v.
Shuford, 454 F2d 772, 776 (4th Cir. 1971) ; United




has uniformly been upheld . 2 This result has
been reached on the basis of the language of
rule 8(b), which requires that each count of
the indictment arise out of factually related
acts or transactions in which all defendants
participated at some time.8 3 Because the per-
jury count in the problem under discussion is
based on the grand jury testimony of one who
denies knowledge of, or participation in, the
criminal activity under investigation, the same
evidence necessary to prove one or more de-
fendants guilty of various substantive counts
will also serve to establish the guilt of those
defendants charged with perjury. This identity
of proof establishes the nexus between defend-
ants and offenses which rule 8(b) requires.8 4
The claim that such joinder prejudices the
defendants, however, remains. Under rule 14,
two avenues of attack on the joinder are open.
First, any defendant can challenge joinder of
offenses with which he or another defendant is
charged;15 second, one or more defendants can
challenge joinder of defendants.8 6
A rule 14 motion for severance of counts
properly joined under rule 8(b) is addressed
to the discretion of the trial court.8 7 In exer-
cising that discretion in the factual situation
82 United States v. Braasch, 505 F2d 139 (7th
Cir. 1974) ; United States v. Isaacs, 493
F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974); United States v. Gill, 490 F2d 233 (7th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974);
United States v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) ; United States v. Isaacs, 347 F.
Supp. 743 (N.D. II1. 1972); United States v.
Sweig, 316 F. Supp. 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
United States v. Wolfson, 282 F. Supp. 772
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v. Cohen, 230 F.
Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y.), mandamus denied, 332 F.2d
975 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Haim, 218
F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); United States v.
Verra, 203 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).8 3 E.g., United States v. Isaacs, 347 F. Supp.
743, 761 (N.D. Ill. 1972) ; United States v. Haim,
218 F. Supp. 922, 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
84E.g., United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124,
1159 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974);
United States v. Gill, 490 F2d 233, 238-39 (7th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974);
United States v. Isaacs, 347 F. Supp. 743, 760-61
(N.D. Ill. 1972); United States v. Verra, 203 F.
Supp. 87, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
s8United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1159
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).8sE.g., United States v. Isaacs, 493 F2d 1124
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974);
United States v. Gill, 490 F.2d 233 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974).
87 See note 34 supra.
with which this comment is concerned, trial
courts typically rely on the same factor which
prompted a finding of proper joinder, i.e.,
identity of proof.88 An additional test employed
by trial courts when faced with a motion to se-
ver counts properly joined under rule 8(b) is
whether evidence admissible on one count would
also be admissible at a separate trial of the
remaining count or counts.89
United States v. VerraP° illustrates use of
both tests. In that case, four defendants were
charged with conspiracy to obstruct justice.
One of the defendants so charged was also
named in two counts charging perjury before
the grand jury which investigated the conspir-
acy. The defendants not named in the perjury
counts moved under rule 14 to sever the trial
of the perjury counts from the trial of the con-
spiracy count, claiming that joint trial of all
counts would inject extraneous and confusing
issues into the trial of the conspiracy count;
the defendant named in the perjury counts
joined in this motion. After finding that the
perjury and conspiracy counts were factually
related, the court stated that the commonality
of proof between the offenses charged, absent a
showing that evidence relevant to the perjury
charge would be inadmissible in a trial of the
conspiracy count, militated against a finding of
prejudice sufficient to justify severance of
counts. Holding that evidence of the alleged
perjury would be admissible in a separate trial
of the conspiracy count under the false excul-
patory statements doctrine, the trial court de-
nied the motion for severance. 91
The "identity of proof" reasoning of Verra
was adopted by the trial court in United States
v. Haiin.9 In Hain, under facts similar to
those in Verra, the defendants not named in
the perjury count moved to sever that count,
arguing that joinder of the perjury count with
other counts in the indictment was an attempt
by the government to include them in an im-
plied charge of conspiracy to obstruct justice.
88United States v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. Haim, 218 F.
Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); United States v.
Verra, 203 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
89 See note 88 supra.
90 Id.
91203 F. Supp. at 90-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
92 218 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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The trial court denied the motion, relying en-
tirely upon the reasoning of Verra.
Verra and Haim place primary emphasis in
their consideration of motions under rule 14
on efficiency in the conduct of criminal trials.
Because the criminal justice system commands
but limited resources, this emphasis on
efficiency is not totally unwarranted. However,
this should not be allowed to override a de-
fendant's right to a fair trial. Rule 2 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 3 states
that rules 8 and 14, among others, are in-
tended to provide for the just determination of
criminal cases. Neither Verra nor Haimz dis-
cuss the contribution efficiency makes to a fair
trial. 4 This is especially evident in Hain,
where the defendants' claim placed the good
faith of the government in issue.95
Considerations of trial efficiency should not
be invoked in the particular factual situation
under discussion, for the reasons outlined by
the panel in United States v. Pacente.96 Com-
mon sense dictates that when the liberty of de-
fendants is at stake, protection of the right to
a fair trial should not be dependent upon the
unrealistic assumption that petit jurors are ca-
9 3 FFD. R. CImr. P. 2.
These rules are intended to provide for thejust determination of every criminal proceed-
ing. They shall be construed to secure simplic-
ity in procedure, fairness in administration,
and the elimination of unjustifiable expense
and delay.
94 At first glance it may seem true that when
evidence admissible in a separate trial of one
count would also be admissible in the trial of an-
other count, joint trial of the two counts is not
prejudicial to the defendant. But consider the rea-
soning of the panel in United States v. Pacente,
490 F.2d 661, 664-65 (7th Cir. 1973), rezvd on re-
hearing en banc, 503 F.2d 543, 547-48 (7th Cir.
1974).
95 Courts have recognized, in some contexts at
least, that the good faith of the government injoining offenses and defendants under rule 8(b) is
an issue to be considered when a motion to sever
under rule 14 is made. E.g., United States v. Do-
naway, 447 F.2d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 1971) ; Peter-
son v, United States, 405 F.2d 102 (5th Cir.
1969); United States v. Manfredi, 275 F.2d 588,
593 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 828 (1960).
It is also true, however, that defendants must
make affirmative showings of prejudice when mov-
ing for severance under rule 14. See note 35
supra.
OP 490 F.2d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd on
rehearing en bane, 503 F.2d 543, 547 (7th Cir.
1974).
pable of putting out of their minds the finding
by the grand jury that the defendant lied.97
A motion under rule 14 to sever defend-
ants properly joined under rule 8(b), like a
motion to sever offenses, is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court.98 In exercising
that discretion in the factual situation with
which this comment is concerned, trial courts
base their decision, generally, on the same fac-
tor which permitted joinder of defendants, i.e.,
identity of proof.99
United States v. Sweig °00 illustrates the use
of this test. In that case, two defendants were
charged with conspiracy to defraud the -United
States and with various overt acts in further-
ance thereof; each was also charged with per-
jury before the grand jury investigating the
conspiracy. Both defendants moved under rule
14 for an order granting each a separate trial
on the perjury counts. Finding common ele-
ments of proof in the perjury and substantive
counts, the trial court denied the motion for
severance of defendants. 01
As with motions to sever counts under rule
14, the court in Sweig places primary emphasis
on efficiency when confronted with a motion to
sever defendants. This emphasis on efficiency,
however, detracts from the defendants' right to
a fair trial. This is perhaps best illustrated by
noting the contribution that joinder of substan-
tive offenses and perjury makes to the inability
of defendants to obtain witnesses.
One of the most common arguments asserted
in support of severance of counts or defendants
properly joined under rule 8(b) is the need of
a defendant to call co-defendants as witnesses.
United States v. WolfsonW ' involved such an
argument in support of a motion to sever
counts; United States v. Isaacs 0 3 dealt with
97 "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects
can be overcome by instructions to the jury ...
all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fic-
tion." Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,
453 (1949) (concurring opinion). See also Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 131-32 nn. 6 & 8(1967) ; notes 71-77 supra and accompanying text.
Contra, United States v. Pacente, 503 F.2d 543,
547-48 (7th Cir. 1974).
98 See note 34 supra.
99 United States v. Sweig, 316 F. Supp. 1148,
1157-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
100 316 F. Supp. 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
101 Id. at 1158-59.
102 282 F. Supp. 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
103 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974).
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such an argument in the context of a motion
to sever defendants.
In Wolfson, five defendants were charged
with conspiracy; four of the defendants so
charged were also charged variously with sub-
stantive offenses and perjury before the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission. One defend-
ant, named only in the conspiracy count,
moved to sever the trial of that count from
trial of the counts in which he was not named,
arguing that a joint trial of all counts would
prevent him from calling co-defendants as wit-
nesses. The trial court denied the motion, hold-
ing that the movant had failed to show a prob-
ability that co-defendants would testify on his
behalf. 04
In Isaacs, two defendants charged with dif-
ferent, though factually related, offenses were
joined for trial. One defendant, who was
charged with perjury before the grand jury,
moved to sever his trial from that of his co-
defendant, claiming that he needed the excul-
patory testimony of that co-defendant. The
trial court's denial of the motion was affirmed
by the appellate court, which stated "[the]
court is not required to sever where the possi-
bility of the co-defendant's testifying is merely
colorable or there is no showing that it is any-
thing more than a gleam of possibility in the
defendant's eye." 105
The rulings in Wolfson and Isaacs are in
accord with existing case law dealing with mo-
tions to sever to enable one defendant to call
co-defendants as witnesses. 08 However, use of
this case law in the factual situation under
consideration effectively prevents defendants
from procuring witnesses on their behalf.
104 Cf. United States v. Echeles, 352 F2d 892
(7th Cir. 1965) ; United States v. Gleason, 259 F.
Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
105 United States v. Isaacs, 493 F2d 1124, 1161
(7th Cir. 1974).
108 United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th
Cir. 1974); Smith v. United States, 385 F2d 34,
38 (5th Cir. 1967): United States v. Kahn, 381
F2d 824, 841 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1015 (1967); Brown v. United States, 375 F2d
310, 316-17 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 388 U.S. 915
(1966) ; Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641, 645-
46 (1st Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 971(1965). Cf. United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d
772 (4th Cir. 1971).
For example, had the movant in Wolfson
been able to convince the court that co-defend-
ants would testify on his behalf, he would have
been relegated, under current evidentiary rules,
to calling as witnesses persons known to the
jury to be under indictment for perjury. 0 7
The utility of such a witness already branded
as a liar by one tribunal is limited. 08 The only
certain remedy in such a case is to prohibit the
joinder in the indictment of the perjury
counts.
In Isaacs, unless the movant is able to con-
vince the court that the testimony of his co-
defendant will be forthcoming upon severance,
he is denied the benefit of a witness untainted
by a charge of perjury.
CONCLUSION
Joinder of one indictment of substantive of-
fenses and a charge of perjury before the
grand jury should not be permitted. Such join-
der effectively prevents a defendant from testi-
fying on his own behalf, it prevents him from
obtaining untainted witnesses, and it may even
force him to testify when he would prefer not
to. Despite judicial protestations to the con-
trary, the prejudice engendered by such join-
der cannot be cured by after-the-fact devices
such as limiting instructions to the petit jury.
If fair trials are to be accorded defendants in
criminal cases, the government should not be
permitted to utilize rule 8 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure in such a manner. Alter-
natively, when confronted with rule 14 motions
for severance of offenses or defendants, trial
courts should not persist in the practice of
placing the goal of trial efficiency ahead of a
defendant's right to a fair trial.
107 United States v. Sweig, 316 F. Supp. 1148,
1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Verra,
203 F. Supp. 87, 90-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
An additional hurdle confronting the movant in
Wolfson is the fact that, despite the severance of
counts, persons to be called as witnesses would re-
main co-defendants of the movant in the trial of
the conspiracy count. As such, those persons have
the right under the fifth amendment not to be
called as witnesses at all. United States v. Shu-
ford, 454 F2d 772, 777 (4th Cir. 1971).
10 8 See note 66 supra.
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PROPOSED CHANGES IN PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION
REPORT PROCEDURES
INTRODUcTION
The presentence investigation report has
been described as a compilation of information
about the legal, personal and social history of a
defendant.1 This report is largely an unre-
stricted document regarding the information it
contains2 and the sources of that information.3
Under the current rule,4 the report is prepared
I Roche, The Position for Confidentiality of the
Presentence Investigation Report, 29 ALBANY L.
REv. 206 (1965).
- "This includes . . . offender's previous criminal
record, early life and developmental history, school
and employment record, mental and physical condi-
tion, religion, habits, attitudes, associates and other
pertinent factors." Id. at 209. "The report of the
presentence investigation shall contain any prior
criminal record of the defendant and such infor-
mation about his characteristics, his financial con-
dition and the circumstances affecting his behavior
as may be helpful in imposing sentence or in grant-
ing probation or in the correctional treatment of
the defendant, and such other information as may
be required by the court." FED. R. CI. P. 32(b).
3 "The offender is interviewed as may be family
members, relatives, friends, neighbors, associates,
law enforcement officials, complainants, employers,
clergymen, teachers and others who may possess
any knowledge helpful to an understanding of the
offender and his situation," Roche, supra note 1, at
209. See generally Evjen, Some Guidelines in Pre-
paring Presentence Reports, 37 F.R.D. 177, 179
(1965).
4 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32:
(a) When made. The probation service of
the court shall make a presentence investiga-
tion and report to the court before the imposi-
tion of sentence or the granting of probation,
unless the court otherwise directs. The report
shall not be submitted to the court or its con-
tents disclosed to anyone unless the defendant
has pleaded guilty or has been found guilty.
(b) Report. The report of the presentence
investigation shall contain any prior criminal
record of the defendant and such information
about his characteristics, his financial condi-
tion and the circumstances affecting his behav-
ior as may be helpful in imposing sentence or
in granting probation or in the correctional
treatment of the defendant, and such other in-
formation as may be required by the court.
(c) Disclosure. Before imposing sentence
the court may disclose to the defendant or his
counsel all or part of the material contained
in the report of the presentence investigation
and afford the defendant or his counsel an op-
portunity to comment thereon.
by the probation service and given to the court
after the entrance of a plea of guilty or after
conviction.5 The importance of the sentencing
procedure, which includes the judge's consider-
ation of the presentence report, is magnified
when defendants plead guilty,6 making the sen-
tencing process their only "day in court."
One of the major controversies concerning
the presentence investigation report in federal
courts centers on the question of whether the
due process clause of the fifth amendment7 or
policy considerations require mandatory disclo-
sure to defendant or defense counsel of all or
part of the report, accompanied by the right of
defendant or defense counsel to comment upon
and rebut the report. Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32(c), by amendment in 1966,
adopted the position that disclosure was com-
pletely at the discretion of the court. Rather
than settling the controversy, the 1966 amend-
ment resulted in further divergence in opinions
and practices regarding disclosure of the pre-
sentence investigatory report.8
5 The report is also utilized beyond the sentenc-
ing process by the probation service and prisons to
facilitate rehabilitation.6 In fiscal year 1966, 85 per cent of criminal de-
fendants in the federal district courts pleaded
guilty or nolo contendre. 1966 DIR. OF AB1Q. OFFICE
OF U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 220.
7 U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.8 The experience of the circuit courts of appeal
under the current rule indicates that the defendant
may encounter any of a number of practices con-
cerning the disclosure of the presentence report.
The point of greatest uniformity is that the trialjudge may not establish a policy of nondisclosure,
but must exercise that discretion on a case-by-case
basis. United States v. Miller, 495 F.2d 362 (7th
Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 470 F.2d
285 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Bryant, 442
F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has placed the greatest curbs upon
judicial discretion to withhold information con-
tained in the presentence report. Shelton v. United
States, 497 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1974). Prior to
Shelton this court's most perplexing decisions were
that disclosure of the full presentence report was
not required even after it became known that part
of the report that had been disclosed was inaccur-
ate, United States v. Jones, 473 F.2d 293 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 984 (1973), while at the
PRESENTENCE REPORTS
The Supreme Court has not recognized the
issue' of disclosure as a constitutional question
arising under the due process clause of the
same time holding that defendant must be given
the opportunity to rebut factual reasons stated
orally by the judge for the sentence. United States
v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553 (1973). In something
of a" fit of judicial candor, the court acknowledged
that:
It might appear anomalous or even inconsis-
tent to permit the withholding of presentence
reports and other information relied on by the
sentencing judge . . . while at the same time
requiring the allowance for rebuttal when and
if presentence information is disclosed and
challenged.
Id. at 558.
Recognizing the difficulty of its situation in Shel-
ton, the court decided that defendant must have
the opportunity to rebut information explicitly re-
lied upon in determining sentence. The court found
that as a matter of due process defendant must be
given the opportunity to rebut information con-
cerning alleged prior criminal conduct and, with-
out much guidance, directed the trial court to
make "some accommodation" between the right to
withhold the confidential contents of the report
and the right of defendant to be fairly advised of
information which formed the basis for the sen-
tencing. Shelton v. United States, 497 F.2d 156,
159 (5th Cir. 1974).
The Seventh Circuit holds that the court must
disclose to defendant or defense counsel the sub-
stance of any information in the presentence report
that is "sufficiently important" to affect the sen-
tence. United States v. Miller, 495 F.2d 362 (7th
Cir. 1974). The court has also directed the trial
courts, in instances where certain information is not
disclosed, to "discount ... reliance on the informa-
tion to allow for its lesser reliability." Id. at 365.
Though this court has held that the trial judge
must'exercise discretion on a case-by-case basis, a
defendant recently petitioned the Supreme Court
for certiorari on the ground that the presentence
report had been withheld by the trial court under
a blanket nondisclosure policy. Gorden v. United
States, 495 F.2d 308 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 419
U.S. 833 (1974).
Though the Fourth Circuit feels that "disclosure
when requested should be enforced in order that
the appearance of justice will be fostered and re-
spect for the administration of the law increased,"
it only "urges" the district courts to voluntarily
adopt a policy of routine full disclosure subject to
exception for confidential information where it can
be reasonably expected that disclosure may ad-
versely affect defendant, harm others, or substan-
tially impede the administration of justice. United
States v. Johnson, 495 F.2d 377, 378 (4th Cir. 1974).
The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia requires that the fact of the
exercise of discretion appear on the face of the
record. United States v. Bryant, 442 F.2d 775
(D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Queen, 435
F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1970). But the court has also
held that it is not a denial of due process for a
trial judge to rely upon a presentence report with-
out disclosing its entire contents to defendant and
fifth amendment,9 although the Court has held
that a sentence based upon misinformation
contained in the presentence report constitutes
a failure to meet due process requirements.G
Because the Court rather systematically denied
certiorari to cases asserting a right to disclo-
sure," proponents of curbing judicial discre-
tion have looked to somewhat analogous situa-
tions involving kindred due process issues and
the exercise of judicial discretion.' 2
After years of intense debate,' 3 a period of
without giving defendant an opportunity to rebut.
United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
9 Defendant was convicted by a jury which rec-
ommended the sentence of life imprisonment. After
considering additional information obtained through
the probation service and other sources and con-
sidering defendant's previous criminal record, the
judge sentenced defendant to death. On appeal
defendant contended that the Court could not
consider such information. The Court held that
the due process clause was not violated "merely
because a judge gets additional out-of-court infor-
mation to assist him .... ." Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949).
10 In imposing sentence upon defendant, the trial
judge gave explicit consideration to defendant's
record of previous convictions. It was later conclu-
sively determined that two of the previous convic-
tions were constitutionally invalid. The Court af-
firmed remand for reconsideration of sentence
noting that "we deal here, not with a sentence im-
posed in the informed discretion of a trial judge,
but with a sentence founded at least in part upon
misinformation of constitutional magnitude." United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972).
11See Gorden v. United States, 495 F2d 308
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974);
Shelton v. North Carolina, 18 N.C. App. 616, 197
S.E.2d 588, cert. denied, 415 U.S. 976 (1974);
Dowell v. Utah, 30 Utah 323, 517 P.2d 1016, cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 962 (1974).
12 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
(procedural protection required in revocation or
parole); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967)
(extent of the right of counsel at time of sentenc-
ing where the sentence is deferred subject to pro-
bation) ; Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541
(1966) (manner in which a juvenile court exer-
cised its discretion to waive jurisdiction over the
defendant).
-13 For arguments favoring disclosure see Pro-
posed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure
for the United States District Courts, 39 F.R.D.
69, 278 (1966) (Douglas, 3., dissenting in part);
Gray, Post Trial Discovery: Disclosure of the
Presentence Investigation Report, 4 U. ToLEDO L.
REv. 1 (1972); Higgins, Confidentiality of Pre-
sentence of Reports. 28 ALBANY L. REv. 12
(1964) ; Lehrich, The Use and Disclosure of Pre-
sentence Reports in the U.S., 47 F.R.D. 225
(1970) ; Thomsen Confidentiality of the Presentenee
Report: A Middle Position, 28 FED. PRoa. 8
(1964) ; Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and
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near chaos among the federal courts, 14 and the
advocacy of disclosure by major legal organi-
zations,' 5 the Supreme Court on April 23, 1974
adopted an amendment to the current Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)." 6 The pro-
posed amendment imposes some limitations
upon the trial courts but does not abolish the
role of judicial discretion as to the disclosure
of the presentence report. By specifying the
reasons for which the court may refuse disclo-
sure to defendant or defense counsel, the pro-
posed amendment limits the broad discretion of
the court provided by the current rule. The
proposed amendment also requires the court to
give defendant or defense counsel a summary
of aty part of the report relied upon in sen-
tence determination which has been withheld
according to the specified exceptions.
This comment will analyze whether the pro-
posed amendment is a meaningful alternative
to the failures of the current rule and whether
it adequately responds to the case made for
greater disclosure. First, however, the general
debate among commentators surrounding the
issue of disclosure and the responses of various
legal organizations in the form of model acts
and proposals will be discussed.
THE DISCLOsuRE DEBATE
Positions for and against greater disclosure
of the presentence report are based upon two
considerations: (a) a constitutional due proc-
ess right to disclosure and (b) the weighing
of various policy considerations. Advocates of
broad judicial discretionary powers regarding
Responsibility, 65 HARV. L., REv. 1281, 1291 (1952) ;
Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentenc-
ing for Felony, 81 HARV. L. REv. 821 (1968). For
discussions opposing any limitations upon the
courts' discretion see JuDICIAL CONFEmNcE Com-
MITTEE ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROBATION
SYSTEM, JUDICIAL OPINION ON PROPOSED CHANGE
IN RULE 32(c) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CR.mi-
NAL PaocuRE-A SuRveY (1964); Parsons, The
Presentence Investigation Report Must Be Pre-
served as a Confidential Document, 28 FED. PRoB.
3 (1964) ; Roche, supra note 1.
14 See note 8 supra.
15 See analysis of model acts and recommenda-
tions in text following note 39 infra.
16 Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 416 U.S. 1001, 1023 (1974). The order
of the Court transmitting the proposed amendment
to Congress provides that the amendment take
effect August 1, 1974; however the effective date
has been postponed until August 1, 1975. For the
text of the proposed amendment see note 65 infra.
disclosure17 generally begin by interpreting the
decision of the Supreme Court in Williams v.
New York' s to hold that defendant does not
have a constitutional right to disclosure of in-
formation in the presentence report. Dismiss-
ing any effort to raise the issue to a constitu-
tional level,'1  they contend that after
conviction a case is no longer an action at law,
but rather, a "social problem." 20 Viewing the
issue of disclosure solely in terms of policy
considerations, advocates of broad judicial dis-
cretion argue three points:
(1) Disclosure will dry up sources of
informatior, and diminish the quality of
the presentence report;
(2) Disclosure will unduly delay the
sentencing process;
(3) Disclosure of certain parts of the
report may be harmful to the rehabilitation
efforts, such as disclosure of psychiatric
evaluations or recommendations by proba-
tion officers who might later be assigned
to supervise the defendant.21
The validity of these assertions is doubtful
in light of the actual experiences of courts
which routinely disclose the report2 2 as well as
the arguments advanced by proponents of man-
datory disclosure.23 Probably one of the major
factors motivating advocates of mandatory dis-
closure is the all too possible situation of a de-
fendant incarcerated for five years rather than
one year (during which he is subjected to in-
appropriate "rehabilitative efforts") because
the sentencing judge and the prison officials
relied upon an inaccurate presentence report.24
17 For representative sample see note 13 FuPra.
1s 337 U.S. 241.
19 For articles assuming this perspective see note
13 supra.
20 "After conviction a case ceases to be an ac-
tion at law and becomes a social problem" and
therefore creates no need for scrupulous hearings
with full disclosure and confrontation. AmERncAN
BAR AssN., STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING
ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDuREs 220 (Approved
Draft 1968).
21 See relevant articles cited at note 13 supra,
particularly those by Parsons and Lehrich.
22 Chief Judge Roszel Thomsen reported in 1962
that the District of Maryland had customarily dis-
closed the report to defendant's counsel for seven
years without adverse affects. Thomsen, supra note
13, at 9.
23 See pp. 59-60 infra.
24 Concern as to the possibility of such occur-
ences has been expressed. See United States v.
(Vol. 66
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Concern about the procedure which makes that
occurrence so possible is rooted in two rather
different perspectives. First, "guilty" people
are entitled to fair treatment and the protec-
tions warranted by the due process clause of
the fifth amendment; second, the accuracy of
the presentence report is important to effective
correctional treatment which is determined at
the sentencing phase and later at the prison.
From these two basic propositions stem the
various attacks on the judicial discretion per-
mitted by the current rule. Judge Skelly
Wright, in a vigorous dissent, evaluated the
issue of disclosure and found that:
[A]fter [defendant] is determined to be guilty
of a crime, his protection shrinks to the barest
minimum. From sentencing onward, he is left
at the mercy of a discretionary decision mak-
Dockery, 447 F2d 1178, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(Wright, J., dissenting) ; Lehrich, sitpra note 13.
A small survey of defense attorneys produced
the following results: sixteen of seventeen defense
counsel felt hampered by the secrecy of present-
ence reports, particularly because they were disa-
bled from correcting errors. The consensus was
that serious mistakes often appear in these reports.
Two lawyers cited cases in which defendant's sen-
tence was in part based on an alleged criminal
record when, in fact, defendant had no such rec-
ord. Junior Bar Section of the District of Colum-
bia, Discovery it Federal Criminal Cases, 33
F.R.D. 101, 124 (1963).
The following cases suggest that the concern is
well-founded:
(a) In imposing sentence upon defendant, thejudge gave explicit consideration to defendant's
record of previous convictions. It was later conclu-
sively determined that two of the previous convic-
tions were constitutionally invalid. United States
v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
(b) The court vacated the sentence and remanded
because the district judge may have relied on mis-
information about material factors bearing on the
severity of punishment. United States v. Powell,
487 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1973).
(c) The court found defendant entitled to resen-
tencing because the record supported the contention
that the prior sentence was imposed by reference
to materially inaccurate facts. The sentencingjudge mistakenly believed that defendant had been
previously convicted of three criminal offenses.
(d) Defendant stole a checkbook and wrote a
number of checks totalling $1467. He was sen-
tenced to a term of twenty-one to thirty-five years.
Eight years after conviction, defendant was able
to examine the presentence report and found
grossly inaccurate information including the state-
ment that he had numerous convictions and had
spent most of his life in prisons. In fact, defendant
had one prior conviction-stealing a car at the age
of 18. State v. Pohlabel, 61 N.J. Super. 242, 160
A2d 647 (1966); for discussion of this case see
Gray, supra note 13.
ing by officials proceeding on the basis of
'confidential' information.. 
. . [A] citizen [is]
entitled to know what is happening to him and
why and how it is happening-not as a Kaf-
kaesque victim of Star Chamber secret
proceeding.25
The advocacy of disclosure on constitutional
grounds begins with the general rule that the
due process clause requires a fair hearing
when government acts to seriously injure a
person and when its decision turns upon "ad-
judicative facts." 26 Upon weighing the com-
peting interests, 2' Judge Wright concluded that
in light of defendant's substantial interest and
the "minimal weight" of governmental interest,
the "constitutional balance" is heavily struck in
favor of an adversary process at sentencing.28
It has been noted that the "fairness" embodied
in the due process clause should require notice
to defendant of what information is being used
against him. 29
In addition, proponents of disclosure as a
constitutional right point to procedures analo-
gous to sentencing in which rights of due
process have been determined by the Supreme
Court to require disclosure of information. In
Morrissey v. Brewerso the Court was con-
cerned with procedure for parole revocation.
The Court suggested that the minimum re-
25 United States v. Dockery, 447 F2d 1178, 1191
(D.C. Cir. 1971) ( Wright, J., dissenting). Note
the similarity with a much earlier decision:
The lack of constitutional and evidentiary
safeguards thrown around a convicted offender
is in striking contrast to those surrounding
him before he is found guilty... Yet every
lawyer engaged in defending criminal cases
knows that often a finding of guilt is a fore-
gone conclusion, and that the real issue cen-
ters about the severity of the punishment.
[A] convicted offender is not completely' be-
yond the pale of constitutional protection.
Smith v. United States, 223 F.2d 750, 754 (5th
Cir. 1955).
-6 United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1190
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting).
27 (a) Defendant's interest in the substantive
outcome of the hearing; (b) Defendant's interest
in the particular right to know and meet the evi-
dence in the report; (c) The governmental inter-
est in continued secrecy of the report. United
States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1190 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (Wright, J., dissenting).
2sId. at 1200.
29 Low, Standards Relating to Sentencing Alter-
natives and Procedures, 57 F.R.D. 391, 399
(1972).
so408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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quirements of due process in that situation in-
cluded disclosure to the parolee of evidence
against him, and the opportunity to be heard
and to present witnesses and documentary evi-
dence, as well as a limited right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses. In Kent v.
United States3l the Court considered the dis-
cretionary waiver of jurisdiction by a juvenile
court. One of the grounds of attack was that
the court had denied the juvenile's attorney ac-
cess to an information file which was consid-
ered by the court in waiving jurisdiction. The
Court held that the juvenile court could not
rely upon secret information:
[T]here is no place in our system of law for
reaching a result of such tremendous conse-
quences without ceremony, without hearing,
without effective assistance of counsel, without
statement of reasons. It is inconceivable that a
court of justice dealing with adults with re-
spect to a similar issue, would proceed in this
manner.
3 2
Proponents of mandatory disclosure contend
that sentencing is just such a "similar issue,"
and therefore disclosure of the presentence re-
port should be considered a matter of constitu-
tional Tight.
Advocates of disclosure also utilize argu-
ments based upon policy considerations. The
experiences of jurisdictions which customarily
disclose the presentence report, such as in Cal-
ifornia and Maryland, are used to refute con-
jectures of opponents of disclosure that disclo-
sure of the report will "dry up" sources of
information and diminish the quality of the
presentence report. 33 Perhaps most convincing
31"383 U.S. 541 (1966).
32 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554
(1966).
3 "Experience in jurisdictions which require
disclosure does not lend support to the argument
that disclosure will result in less complete presen-
tence reports.... " Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure for the United States District Courts,
48 V.R.D. 553, 618 (1970) (Advisory Committee
Notes). The presentence report in the District of
Maryland is prepared in two parts: (a) the prin-
cipal body of the report setting out the facts is
ordinarily available to defense counsel and (b) a
much shorter, confidential portion containing the
recommendation of the probation office which is not
made available to defense counsel. Thomsen, supra
note 13.
The "drying up" of sources argument also ap-
plies rather unconvincingly to another frequent
is the statement by Chief Judge Roszel Thom-
sen to the effect that in the District of Mary-
land the presentence report has been customar-
ily shown to defense counsel since 1955
without impairing its utility.3
4
As to the contention that disclosure will un-
duly delay the sentencing process, it is asserted
that the necessity of disclosure to assure jus-
tice outweighs the possible inconvenience. Fur-
thermore, it is contended that experience has
shown that disclosure does not promote unnec-
essary delay.35
After meeting the considerations raised by
proponents of discretion, the advocates of dis-
closure note the crucial importance of accuracy
and assert that the best way of insuring that
accuracy in the presentence report is to dis-
close the report and hear from defendant re-
garding its contents.36 They underpin their po-
sition with arguments based upon the concern
for fairness in the sentencing process.3 7
supplier of information, social welfare agencies,just as it does to other governmental services. The
relation of trust which may exist with defendant
may be worthy of some protection, as Judge-
Wright says; however, "[tihis interest . . . does
not seem sufficient to defeat disclosure. . . . [t]he
governmental interest in denying an individual its
information about him, on the ground that disclo-
sure would make him trust it less, is paternalistic
at best and a gross distortion of priorities. What
is more important-a friendly relationship between
defendant and his welfare worker or the length of
time the defendant must spend in prison?" United
States v. Dockery, 447 F2d 1178, 1197 (D.C. Cir
1971). Furthermore, the "drying up" argument ig-
nores the fact that there is the possibility of that
phenonemon under the discretionary rule as it cur-
rently exists. "Because discretion must be exer-
cised in each case (under the current rule) the
probation officer cannot know whether the report
will be disclosed. Thus no informant can be as-
sured that his information will remain confiden-
tial." Id.
34 Thomsen, supra note 13.
35 Lehrich, supra note 13, at 240.
36 FFm. R. CanI. P. 32, 1972) (Advisory Com-
mittee Notes).
37 "Withholding the information from the de-
fendant or his counsel may permit material of a
derogatory character to be used ex parte against
the defendant. It also deprives the defendant of
any opportunity to help the court in its appraisal
of favorable information. The court . . . is de-
prived of any help from defendant and his counsel
in respect to the report." United States v. Bryant,
442 F.2d 775, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1971). "Defendant
has the right to be fairly advised of the informa-
tion which formed the basis of sentencing." Shel-
ton v. United States, 497 F.2d 156, 159 (5th Cir.
1974). "Disclosure when requested should be fa-
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Three major legal organizations and a presi-
dential commission have considered the issues
involved in this controversy and find the argu-
ments for greater disclosure more persuasive.
The model acts and proposals resulting from
their deliberations all favor some restrictions
upon the court's discretion to withhold infor-
mation used in the determination of sentence.38
The American Bar Association, American
Law Institute, National Council on Crime and
Delinquency, and the President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, in contrast to the divergent court opin-
ions,3 9 have generally favored greater disclo-
sure of presentence reports than is required
under the current rule. As the first codification
in this series of model acts and recommenda-
tions, the Model Penal Code of the American
Law Institute40 seems to have tested the recep-
tiveness of the legal community with its rather
mild provisions which do not require the
showing of the report nor provide for appellate
review of a decision not to disclose. The
Model Penal Code directs the court to advise
the defendant or his counsel of the factual con-
tents and conclusions of the presentence report
as well as allow an opportunity for defendant
to challenge that information upon his request.
In the comment to the disclosure provisions,
the promulgators state that this draft takes a
"middle position" on the issue of disclosure.41
The comment indicates that this position was
taken not only because of a balancing of policy
considerations but also because "[r]esistance to
requiring larger disclosure would... probably
be insuperable." 42
vored in order that the appearance of justice will
be fostered and respect for the admiration of the
law increased." United States v. Johnson, 495 F.2d
377, 378 (4th Cir. 1974).3
8 See notes 40, 45, 46, and 50 infra.
39 See note 8 supra.
40 MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.07(5) (1962) pro-
vides that:
Before imposing sentence, the court shall
advise the defendant or his counsel of the fac-
tual contents and the conclusions of any pre-
sentence investigation or psychiatric examina-
tion and afford fair opportunity, if the
defendant requests, to controvert them. The
sources of confidential information need not,
however, be disclosed.
41 MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.07(5), Comment
(1962).
42 Id.
The Model Sentencing Act of the National
Council 43 provides for mandatory disclosure of
the presentence report to persons determined
to be "dangerous" offenders.4 4 This position of
mandatory disclosure is based on the rationale
that additional safeguards for "dangerous" of-
fenders are deemed required by due process be-
cause of the possible length of commitment and
the character of the findings required before
sentence may be imposed, such as whether de-
fendant may be characterized as suffering from
a severe personality disorder indicating a pro-
pensity toward criminal activity and whether
defendant poses a threat to public safety.4
4 3 
MODEL SENTENCING ACT (1963).
44 One is determined by the court to be a "dan-
gerous" offender on the basis of several criteria.
First, the court will find that the crime committed
was a felony and that commitment of 30 years or
less is required for the protection of the public be-
cause of the dangerousness of defendant. Then the
court must also find one or more of the following:(a) a felony in which defendant inflicted or at-
tempted to inflict serious bodily harm and the
court finds him suffering from a severe personality
disorder indicating a propensity toward criminal
activity; (b) a crime which seriously endangered
the life or safety of another, previous convictions
for one or more felonies not related to the instant
crime as a single criminal episode and that defend-
ant is suffering from a severe personality disorder
indicating a propensity toward criminal activity;(c) a crime of extortion, compulsory prostitution,
selling or knowingly and unlawfully transporting
narcotics, or other felony, committed as part of a
continuing criminal activity in concert with one or
more persons. These findings are required to be
incorporated into the record. MODEL SENTENCING
ACT § 5 (1963).
-1 Ordinary felony offenders are sentenced ac-
cording to the alternatives provided in section 9 of
the Model Sentencing Act: a) suspension of the
imposition or execution of the sentence with or
without probation; b) probation; c) fine with or
without probation or commitment; d) commitment
for a term of 5 years or less or commitment to a
local correctional facility for a term of one year
or less. MODEL SENTENCING AcT § 9 (1963).
The Act leaves to the discretion of the court
whether to disclose the presentence report or parts
of it to defendant or others or whether to conceal
the identity of persons who provided confidential
information if defendant is sentenced under section
9. However, if defendant is to be sentenced under
section 5 (cited in note 44 supra) or section 7(which provides the life-sentence for defendants
convicted of first-degree murder), the judge is re-
quired to make the presentence report, the report
of the diagnostic center, and other diagnostic re-
ports available to the attorney for the state and to
the defendant or his counsel or other representa-
tive upon request. Furthermore, subject to the con-
trol of the court, defendant is entitled to
1975]
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While the Model Sentencing Act recognizes a
due process right to complete disclosure as to
"dangerous" offenders within its restructured
sentencing process, the interest of the "ordi-
nary" offenders and the function of the pre-
sentence report in their sentencing is apparently
considered insufficient to raise a due process
requirement of disclosure.
The President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and Administration of Justice opted
for the fairness and balancing of the Model
Penal Code and provided for inspection of the
report itself, but the Commission found cir-
cumstances which could outweigh defendant's
interest and so provided for exceptions to
disclosure.46 Noting that the facts necessary to
a judge's determination of sentence will be ab-
sent when conviction has resulted from a plea
of guilty, the President's Commission finds
that fairness requires that defendant be given
an opportunity to present information to the
court and to contest the accuracy of important
factual statements in the report. Omitting any
provision for appellate review of nondisclosure,
the President's Commission recommends:
In the absence of compelling reasons for non-
disclosure of special information, the defendant
and his counsel should be permitted to exam-
ine the entire presentence report.4
7
Discussing this recommendation, the Presi-
dent's Commission indicates that within the
cross-examine those who make these reports to the
court. The reports then become part of the record.
The presentence report plays a very significant
role in this sentencing structure. It is one of the
critical factors utilized by the court in determining
whether defendant is a "dangerous" offender,
whether defendant comes within section 5 (a) or
(b) as a sufferer from a severe personality disor-
der indicating a propensity toward criminal activ-
ity, and is also significant as the judge makes de-
cisions as to sentencing alternatives under section9.
46 "In many cases information clearly could be
disclosed without substantial likelihood of harm;
yet there can be circumstances in which the partic-
ularly confidential nature of the source of the in-
formation may preclude its disclosure, or in which
disclosure of a statement would be harmful to re-
habilitation.... [Furthermore] social, welfare andjuvenile agencies.., might stop providing informa-
tion if disclosure were compelled." PREsIDENT's
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADmIN-
IsTRATIoN OF JusTIcE, THE CHALLENGE Or CRIME
IN A-FREE SocrEY 144 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME].
4 Id. at 145.
category of "compelling reasons" are circum-
stances such as preclusion of disclosure because
of the particularly confidential nature of the
source of information or the possibility that
the disclosure of certain statements would be
harmful to rehabilitation.48  The President's
Commission would leave these matters to the
"proper exercise of judicial discretion." 49
The American Bar Association noted possi-
ble constitutional grounds, but perhaps as a
tactic of persuasion, based its advocacy of
mandatory disclosure with "limited excep-
tions" 5 upon policy considerations:
[A]s a matter of policy... disclosure of the re-
port ought to be required because such a
practice will increase the fairness of the sys-
tem . . . increase the appearance of fairness,
and .. . assure a greater degree of accuracy
in the sentencing determination.5'
Implementing these policy considerations, the
American Bar Association would require dis-
closure of the substance of all derogatory
48 Outlined in note 46 supra.
49 THE CHALLENGE OF CRiME, supra note 46, at
144.
50 The disclosure section proposed by the
American Bar Association states:
(a) Fundamental fairness to the defendant
requires that the substance of all derogatory
information which adversely affects his inter-
ests and which has not otherwise been dis-
closed in open court should be called to the
attention of the defendant, his attorney, and
others who are acting on his behalf.
(b) This principle should be implemented
by requiring that the sentencing court permit
the defendant's attorney, or the defendant him-
self, if he has no attorney, to inspect the re-
port. The prosecution should also be shown
the report if it is shown to the defense. In ex-
traordinary cases, the court should be permit-
ted to except from disclosure parts of the rec-
ord which are not relevant to a proper
sentence, diagnostic opinion which might seri-
ously disrupt a program of rehabilitation, or
sources of information which have been ob-
tained on a promise of confidentiality. In all
cases where parts of the report are not dis-
closed under such authority, the court should
be required to state for the record the reasons
for its action and to inform the defendant and
his attorney that information has not been dis-
closed. The action of the court in excepting
information from disclosure should be subject
to appellate review. ABA, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROcE-
DURES § 4.4 (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ABA STANDARDS].




information 52 to defense counsel or to defend-
;ant if unrepresented. 3 This disclosure is the
inspection of the report rather than a recita-
tion of its contents or a summary by the sen-
tencing judge. The American Bar Association
finds that the adversary system serves two im-
-portant functions which should be preserved
during the sentencing process: (a) the judicial
system cannot function in a consistent and ra-
tional manner unless methods are devised to
provide it with complete and reliable informa-
tion about the defendant; and (b) the prose-
tution and defense ought to be afforded a
meaningful chance to test the reliability of
the information which is to be used in
aentencing.54
The discussion of the disclosure issue by
-commentators, the model acts and recommen-
dations of these legal organizations, along with
the decisions and discussion of the issue by
federal courts have played a significant role in
the evolution of the current proposed amend-
ment to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
32(c). The formal structure for amending fed-
eral rules consists of an Advisory Committee
on Criminal Rules which submits its recom-
mendations to the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, both com-
prised of judges, lawyers and legal scholars.55
Furthermore, the final proposals of these com-
mittees are not made to the Supreme Court
until amended drafts are submitted and some-
times redrafted and submitted to the bench and
52 All but one member of the Committee would
have further implemented that principle by permit-
ting the defense attorney and prosecuting attorney
to inspect the entire report, with carefully limited
exceptions. Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at commentary to § 4.1.
5 In 1960, the Chief justice appointed six na-
tionally-oriented committees including the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
and the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules.
The Advisory Committee is to conduct the basic
studies and develop reports and recommendations
for submission to the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure. The Standing
Committee then reports to the Judicial Conference
of the United States. If approved, the Judicial
Conference forvards the report and recommenda-
tions to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
may then approve, modify, or disapprove of the
changes in the Federal rules, and those adopted
will be transmitted by the Supreme Court to Con-
gress. 18 U.S.C.A. xv-xviii.
bar for consideration and suggestions. 56 This
interaction is clearly evident in the effort to
obtain stronger disclosure requirements.
Since 1962 the Advisory Committee on the
Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure has
urged mandatory disclosure of the presentence
report. The 1962 preliminary draft provided
that upon request of defendant the court dis-
close to defendant or his counsel a summary of
the material contained in the presentence
report. r7 The second draft in 1964 went fur-
ther and required the court to permit counsel
for defendant to read the report, but without
the sources of confidential information. If de-
fendant were not represented by counsel, the
court was required to disclose to defendant,
upon request, the essential facts in the presen-
tence report.58 However, the amendment as
5s For a description of this interaction see Van-
derbilt's description of the evolution of the federal
rules. Vanderbilt, Proceeding at the Institute of
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 5 F.R.D. 88,
93 (1946). Note that this is the continuing method
of drafting proposed rules. Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure for the United States District
Courts, 48 F.R.D. 553 (1970).
57 Upon request of the defendant the court be-
fore imposing sentence shall disclose to the
defendant or his counsel a summary of the
material contained in the report of the pre-
sentence investigation and afford an opportu-
nity to the defendant or his counsel to com-
ment thereon. The sources of confidential
information need not, however, be disclosed.
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to
the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United
States District Courts, 31 F.R.D. 665, 686 (1962).
58 The second draft of the proposed amendment
provided:
If the defendant is represented by counsel
and so requests, the court before imposing
sentence shall permit counsel for the defendant
to read the report of the presentence investi-
gation (from which the sources of confidential
information may be excluded) and shall afford
-such counsel an opportunity to comment
thereon. If the defendant is not represented by
counsel and so requesting, the court siall
communicate, or have communicated, to the
defendant the essential facts in the report of
the presentence investigation (from which
communication the sources of confidential in-
formation may be excluded) and shall afford
the defendant an opportunity to comment
thereon. Any material disclosed to the defend-
ant or his counsel shall also be disclosed to
the attorney for the government.
Second Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amdii'd-
ments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
United States District Courts, 34 F.R.D. 441; 438(1964). . .
In drafting both of these proposed ameridmnits
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adopted in 1966 took a different position as
to disclosure than did these earlier proposals.59
It has been suggested that the Advisory Com-
mittee -changed its position because of substan-
tial objections advanced by federal judges.60 In
1970 the Advisory Committee submitted
another proposal to the Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference.61 This proposal provided for man-
the Advisory Committee based its pro-disclosure
position upon policy considerations and explicitly
stated that defendants do not have a due process
right -to disclosure. The Advisory Committee sim-
ply stated that "Itihe amendment is designed to
give the defendant the opportunity to comment on
the facts contained in the report without going so
far as to compel disclosure of the entire report."
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to
Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States
District Courts, 31 F.R.D. 665, 687 (1962). Ad-
visory Committee Notes).
59 The relevant portions of the rule are given in
note 4 supra.
60 Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 54 Go. L.J. 1276, 1308 (1966). Some
probation officers and other persons with similar
interests organized an extensive campaign against
the second draft's proposal for compulsory disclo-
sure. A survey was taken of federal judges, from
which it was made to appear that 290 judges op-
posed compulsory disclosure, twenty-five favored
compulsory disclosure, and six had no opinion. The
Judicial Conference Committee on the Administra-
tion of the Probation System voted unanimously
against compulsory disclosure. 2 C. WRIGHT, Fm-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 524. See JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE COMMIITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE PROBATION SYSTEM, JUDICIAL OPINION ON
PROPOSED CHANGE IN RULE 32(c) OF THE FED-
ERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-A SURVEY
(1964). The Advisory Committee acknowledged
the influence of such objections in its note: "Sub-
stantial objections to compelling disclosure in
every case have been advanced by federal judges,
including many who in practice often disclose all
or parts of presentence reports. . . . Hence, the
amendment goes no further than to make it clear
that courts may disclose all or part of the presen-
tence report to the defendant or to his counsel."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (1966) (Advisory Committee
Notes).
61 (1) Before imposing sentence the court
shall permit the defendant, and his counsel if
he is so represented, to read the report of the
presentence investigation unless in the opinion
of the court the report contains information
which if disclosed would be harmful to the de-
fendant or other persons, and the court shall
afford the defendant or his counsel an oppor-
tunity to comment thereon.
(2) If the court is of the view that there is
information in the presentence report, disclo-
sure of which, would be harmful to the de-
fendant or to other persons, the court in lieu
of making the report or part thereof available
shall state orally or in writing a summary of
datory disclosure with an exception permitted
if in the opinion of the court disclosure would
be "harmful to the defendant or other per-
sons."' 2 If the court made such a determina-
tion, a summary of the factual information
contained in the report and relied upon in de-
termining sentence was to be given to defend-
ant or his counsel. 63 The Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure then solicited the
consideration and suggestions of judges and
attorneys. 64 The final provisions of the pro-
posed amendment indicate that to some extent
the arguments favoring disclosure are becom-
ing more persuasive.
THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT
The proposed amendment65 directs the court
to permit defendant or defense counsel to read
the report and comment while providing ex-
ceptions to total disclosure for:
(a) recommendations of sentence;
(b) diagnostic opinions which might seri-
ously disrupt a program of rehabilitation;
the factual information contained therein to be
relied on in determining sentence, and shall
give the defendant or his counsel an opportu-
nity to comment thereon. The statement may
be made to the parties in camera.
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
United States District Courts, 48 F.R.D. 553, 614(1970).
62 See note 61 supra.
63 Id.
64 48 F.R.D. 553 (1970).
65 The proposed amendment provides:
(3) Disclosure.
(A) Before imposing sentence the court
shall upon request permit the defendant or his
counsel if he is so represented, to read the re-
port of the presentence investigation exclusive
of any recommendation as to sentence unless
in the opinion of the court the report contains
diagnostic opinion which might seriously dis-
rupt a program of rehabilitation, sources of
information obtained upon a promise of confi-
dentiality, or any other information which, if
disclosed might result in harm, physical or
otherwise, to the defendant or other persons;
and the court shall afford the defendant or his
counsel an opportunity to comment thereon.
(B) If the court is of the view that there
is information in the presentence report which
should not be disclosed under subdivision
(c) (3) (A) of this rule, the court in lieu of
making the report or part thereof available
shall state orally or in writing a summary of
the factual information contained therein to be
relied on in determining sentence, and shall
give the defendant or his counsel an opportu-
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(c) sources of information obtained upon a
-promise of confidentiality;
(d) any information which, if disclosed
-might result in physical or other harm to de-
fendant or other people.68
If the court determines that some information
should not be disclosed pursuant to these ex-
ceptions, the court is to provide an oral or
written summary of the factual information re-
lied upon in determining the sentence and af-
ford an opportunity to comment.8 7
The proposed amendment does not comport
-with the argument that the presentence report
should be disclosed to defendant as a matter of
right to due process. However, the Advisory
-Committee Note to the proposed amendment
omits, perhaps significantly, the statement de-
nying a due process right to disclosure. 68 This
statement has accompanied its drafts since
1962 and is included in the note to the current
rule. 69 In addition, the Advisory Committee
speaks of the importance to defendant of the
accuracy of information contained in the pre-
sentence report.70 Perhaps, interpreting the
-note in light of Judge Wright's balancing of
-competing interests, this brief glimmer of ex-
planation from the Advisory Committee is, in
essence, a sub rosa acknowledgment of defend-
ant's constitutional right to disclosure under
-the due process clause.
It is doubtful, however, whether the pro-
nity to comment thereon. The statement may
be made to the parties in camera.
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
'Criminal Procedure for the United States District
,Courts, 62 F.R.D. 271, 320-21 (1974).
Or See note 65 supra.
7 Id.
68 "It is not a denial of due process of law for a
,court in sentencing to rely on a report of a pre-
sentence investigation without disclosing such re-
port to the defendant or giving him an opportunity
to rebut it". Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amend-
ments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
United States District Courts, 31 F.R.D. 665, 686
(1962) (Advisory Committee Notes); Second
Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure for the United States District Courts
.34 F.R.D. 411, 438 (1964) (Advisory Committee
Notes) ; see also FED. R. CIm. P. 32.
60 See note 68 supra.
70 "The Advisory Committee is of the view that
accuracy of sentencing information is important
not only to the defendant...." Proposed Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
for the United States District Courts, 62 F.R.D.
271, 325 (Advisory Committee Notes).
posed amendment lends itself to such a recog-
nition of due process rights. Within the Advi-
sory Committee note it appears that the
proposed amendment is the product of policy
considerations recognizing the importance of
accuracy in the sentencing process itself and
in correctional treatment and deciding that
"[tihe best way of insuring accuracy is disclo-
sure...."71 Countering some of the policy argu-
ments raised by opponents of disclosure, the
Note states that the experience in jurisdictions
which practice disclosure has not resulted in
less complete reports, nor in unnecessary delay,
nor is the probation officer subjected to rigo-
rous examination.72 The proposed amendment
does not give the impression of facilitating a
due process right to disclosure since its excep-
tions to disclosure seem to fall short of the
"narrow exceptions" r7 to mandatory disclosure
appropriate for the protection of such a right.
Presuming then that the proposed amend-
ment is based upon the balancing of policy
considerations, the exceptions to disclosure
should be analyzed in view of whether the pol-
icy considerations favoring disclosure have
prevailed in any meaningful way and whether
the divergent practices of the federal courts
will, under the proposed amendment, be re-
placed by uniform disclosure practices.
The proposed amendment excepts from dis-
closure "diagnostic opinions" which might se-
riously disrupt a program of rehabilitation.7 4
The proposed amendment fails to define what
opinions in the presentence report shall be con-
sidered diagnostic. Neither is there clarifica-
tion as to what the court should consider in
making the determination that disclosure
"might seriously disrupt a program of
rehabilitation." 75 This exception should func-
tion only as to a diagnostic opinion by a'psy-
chiatrist when the psychiatrist certifies that
disclosure would harm treatment of
7 1 d.
72 Id.
73 "[M]ost of the legitimate objections to dis-
closure and comment can be washed away easily
by building narrow exceptions into the scope of
mandatory disclosure and by setting careful
ground rules for the extent of a defendant's adver-
sary comment on the presentence report"' United
States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1196 (D.C. Cir.




defendant. 6 If the exception is not so limited,
it is possible that this exception may operate
as a, catch-all for "diagnostic opinions" of-
fered by probation officers and others without
adequately protecting defendant from bias and
prejudice together with erroneous information.77
Another exception to disclosure concerns the
discretion of the court to withhold the presen-
tence report if it contains sources of informa-
tion obtained upon a promise of confidential-
ity.78 It is the current practice, to be continued
by the proposed amendment, that the probation
service conduct the presentence investigation
and compile the report. Since the proposed
amendment does not require that the probation
officer obtain the court's permission to offer a
promise of confidentiality nor establish stan-
dards by which to exercise this discretion, it ap-
pears that a weighty and unchecked discretion-
ary power has been placed in the hands of the
probation officer. When joined with the final
exception the result is the creation of the per-
fect vehicle for the prevention of disclosure of
information which may be most influential but
should be most suspect in determining the sen-
tence.
The final exception provides for the discre-
tionary withholding of information if the court
thinks the information may result in harm to
defendant or others."9 A probation officer may,
upon his own discretion, promise defendant's
worst enemy not to reveal his identity as the
source of particular information. Upon obtain-
ing the presentence report, the judge appar-
ently is bound not to reveal the name of that
informant. Unless enlightened by the probation
.6 judge Skelly Wright makes this recommenda-
tion after discussing the dangers of pseudo-scien-
tific characterizations to defendant. United States
v. Dockery, 447 F2d 1178, 1198-99 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (Wright, J., dissenting).
77 The following is a sample of the information
in one presentence report: "Mueller learned to be
somewhat of an aristocrat of the German Junker
type, arrogant, domineering, clever, aggressive,
who in the promulgation of his schemes became
insulated from concern for the rights of others.
This amalgam of training, opportunity, education,
environment, and reversion to the ancestral type
has made Mueller what he is as a person today.
His ancestral language has a term which about
covers his personality. That term is 'schlick'."
Evien, supra note 3, at 179.
SsSee note 65 supra.
79 Id.
officer as to the informant's antagonism toward
defendant the judge will not be in a position to
properly evaluate that information since de-
fendant is barred by nondisclosure from assist-
ing the court. In exercising the discretion pro-
vided for by the final exception, the judge may
withhold the information which was gathered
from an informant of questionable reliability.
These two exceptions may operate to seriously
damage the accuracy of information utilized in
sentence determination and effective correc-
tional treatment.
Section 32(3) (b) 80 provides that if the
court withholds any information contained in
the presentence report, the court is to state
orally or in writing a summary of the factual
information contained in the report or in the
withheld portion relied upon in determining
sentence. This provision, however, gives the
court a broad degree of unchecked discretion.
If the court's summary differs greatly from the
report itself, the defendant will be unable to
prevent the use of improper information
against him, not only by the judge but also by
the prison in which he may be incarcerated.
The proposed amendment does not sufficiently
protect against the possibility of some informa-
tion being classified as "factual" while perhaps
highly damaging information is designated in
some other fashion. The defendant, then, will
be unable to challenge a sentence on the basis
of being given an inaccurate summary s '
The proposed amendment, rather than mark-
ing the abandonment of an "unsuccessful ex-
periment with discretionary disclosure," 82
would maintain a sentencing procedure still
burdened with excessive discretion because of
its nondefinitive exceptions to disclosure. Fur-
thermore, by allowing a probation officer to
promise secrecy to informants, the proposed
amendment may promote the acquisition of
particularly unreliable information which still
may not be sufficiently revealed to defendant.
The controversy surrounding the disclosure
of the presentence report crystalizes the prob-
so See note 65 supra.
81 The sample in note 77 supra indicates the
type of material which would pose difficulties in
being adequately summarized.
82 The commentator apparently felt some opti-
mism for the success of the 1970 proposed amend-
ment 8A. J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE § 32.03(4)
at 32-37 (2d ed. 1974).
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lems inherent in coping with the broad judicial
discretion exercised under the current rule
32(c). The rule has not provided uniformity
of disclosure practices among the federal
courts and most importantly has not lessened
the possibility of miscarriages of justice which
could be avoided by disclosure of sentencing
information. Given these difficulties under the
current discretionary rule and in light of the
history of the Advisory Committee's advocacy
of disclosure and its stated reasons for promot-
ing disclosure-the significance and insurance
of accuracy of sentencing information to de-
fendant and to effective correctional treatment
-the'proposed amendment seems a curious ef-
fort. Apparently, the rejection of bolder pro-
posed amendments, opposition to disclosure
within the legal community, and the general
consensus among organizations representative
of that community have significantly defined
for the Advisory Committee the parameters
within which, it may fashion any limitation
upon judicial discretion.
Perhaps, too, the basis for the inadequacies
of the proposed amendment, as well as the
model sentencing proposals, is the avoidance of
acknowledging a full-blown constitutional right
of defendants to know what information is
being used against them, coupled with an abid-
ing fear that the sentencing process may col-
lapse if deprived of secrecy. The result is a
proposed amendment which, though perhaps
improving the possibility for meaningful dis-
closure, does not adequately deal with the diffi-
culties evident under the current rule.
An appropriate disclosure rule should prefer-
ably be grounded in the recognition of the
constitutional due process right to disclosure of
the presentence report. In the alternative, the
serious weighing of policy considerations
should also support the development of a rule
solidly favorable to disclosure. It is clear that
the additional information of the presentence
report can be invaluable in the determination
of a just sentence. Furthermore, the presen-
tence report is subject to continued utilization
by the probation service and prisons. Because
the sentencing procedure has been allowed to
function in secrecy, it is important that habit
not influence the continuation of secrecy, fur-
thering a rather anomalous feature in our con-
cept of justice. The Advisory Committee has,
through its variety of proposals, attempted to
meet the valid concerns opposed to complete
mandatory disclosure. The proposed amend-
ment, however, attests to the fact that the judi-
cial system has moved but little beyond that
"middle position" taken by the Model Penal
Code in 1962.83
83 See note 40 supra.
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